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Preface 
 
 
 
The European agricultural sector is experiencing severe adjustments. Accession to EU, 
CAP-Reform and the effects of food safety crises are just some of the drivers of these ad-
justments. For Farm Accountancy Data Networks (FADNs) this implies new challenges to 
innovate and come up with relevant data. 
 To exchange experiences in this domain the PACIOLI group yearly organises a 
workshop. In 2004 we choose not for the normal 3-day workshop with one of the FADNs, 
but accepted the invitation of the OECD in Paris to co-operate in a policy seminar with in 
addition a one day workshop for the PACIOLI group itself. These events where held on 
April 28, 29 and 30 respectively. This report contains the presentations from the PACIOLI 
1-day workshop on April 28. The papers of the policy seminar will be seperatly published 
by the OECD. 
 We are indebted to the OECD, and in particularly to Catherine Morredu, Carmen 
Cahil and Marina Giacalone for the support in organising the meetings. This included the 
provision of the meeting room with accompanying services for the PACIOLI meeting. 
Corrie de Zwijger helped to prepare the workshop from the Netherlands and once again 
Helga van der Kooij took care of the creation of the publication. 
 We are happy that our Norwegian colleagues invited us for the PACIOLI-13 meeting 
to be held on June 6-8, 2005 in the west of Norway. Check our website www.pacioli.org 
for upcoming details. 
 
The managing director 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 The Pacioli-network 
 
Innovative ideas face many hurdles to become successful implementations. This is also 
true in farm accounting and in Farm Accountancy Data Networks (FADNs). Therefore it 
makes sense to bring together the 'change agents', the persons that have a personal drive to 
change the content of their work and their organisations. For farm accounting and policy 
supporting FADNs it is appropriate to do this in an international context: this creates pos-
sibilities to learn from each other. By bringing FADN managers and data users in micro 
economic research together, feedback is fostered. 
 It is with this background that the Pacioli-network organises a workshop every year. 
This small but open network has become a breeding place for ideas on innovations and 
projects. 
 Pacioli was originally a Concerted Action in the EU's Third Framework Programme 
for Research and Technical Development (AIR3-CT94-2456). After completion of the 
contract with the PACIOLI-4 workshop, the partners decided to keep the network alive at 
their own costs. 
 
 
1.2 The theme of PACIOLI-12 
 
FADNs are excellent tools to monitor income development at the micro level. With the re-
form of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in the enlarged European Union, FADNs 
face an important task to make the agricultural policy more efficient and relevant. Next 
years many farmers will receive direct payments, decoupled from production. This will 
lead to more freedom in production decisions, probably more heterogeneity in farm sys-
tems and sources of household income, and to decisions to cap payments for the largest 
farms. It is also likely that policy makers and the society at large will more often question 
the efficiency of this policy: why should large farms get large amounts of money, why do 
they benefit from an extra safety net? It is most likely that FADN data will play a vital role 
in such discussions. We expect that these discussions will quickly raise questions on 
household and personal income (and even wealth), and in comparison to other persons in 
the economy. That will lead to a request for new data (on non-farm and household income 
for example) and new indicators. 
 These topics were already discussed in PACIOLI-11, in 2003 in Poland. For the 2004 
workshop in Paris a number of contributers extended the discussion. Papers from Sweden, 
Finland and the Netherlands looked into new data or new ways to extract data from e.g. tax 
sources to see which income farmers make from other sources than agriculture and if this 
helps them to cope with the changing environment in agriculture. The RICA unit of the 
European Commission contributed with an overview of the information available in the 
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European FADN. What was also new in PACIOLI-12 was the discussion on how the CAP 
Reform as well as these non-agricultural activities should and could influence farm typol-
ogy. The results of a brainstorming in a working group session on that issue are reported. 
 On the analysis with micro data from the FADN of effects of the CAP on farm in-
come papers from Germany and Spain showed new results. These papers show the 
usefulness of the micro data and help FADN managers to think on demands for new types 
of data. 
 
 
1.3 Programme PACIOLI-12 
 
Location: Monaco Conference Room, 2, Rue du Conseiller Collignon, 75016 Paris close to 
the metro La Muette 
 
Wednesday, 28 April 2004 
 
09:30 Welcome, Agenda and Introduction participants 
 
09:45 The use of administrative registers in the collection of farm income data and 
the effects on definitions on farms and farm households 
 Ann-Marie Karlsson (Statistics, Sweden) 
 
10.15 Classification and economic results of part time and full time farms using tax 
data 
 Maija Puurunen (MTT, Finland) 
 
10.45 Break 
 
11.15 Developments in the organization of the farm and their policy implications 
 Krijn Poppe (LEI, The Netherlands) 
 
11.45 Workgroup Session I 
 
12.30 Lunch 
 
14.00 Impact of enlargement and CAP reform to Latvian farmers 
 Valda Bratka (Latvian State Institute of Agrarian Economics, Latvia) 
 
14.30 Use of micro data (FADN) in policy analysis - the case of the MTR 
 Werner Kleinhanss (FAL, Germany) 
 
15.00 Break 
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15.30 The poverty of Farmers and the Wealth of Landlords - Farm Income Distribu-
tion and direct support equity under CAP 
 Carlos San Juan (Carlos III University, Spain) 
 
16.00 Workgroup Session II 
 
17.00 Open slot for a last moment presentation 
 
17.30 Questions and Answers/Closing 
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2. Collection of farm income data in Sweden 
 
 
 
Ann-Marie Karlsson 1 
 
 
 
 
Collection of Farm-
income data in Sweden
Merge of registers based on
natural persons:
• Farm-register
– All swedish farmers threshold 2 ha 
of arable land
– Swedish and EU-typology,
– Region (parrish)
• Extended income register
– Incomes from business, 
capital and employment
– Positive and negative
transfers
 
                                                 
1 Statistics Sweden, Örebro. 
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Forming of households
Included in the household
• Maximum two generations who 
live at the same real estate
• Who are related through
– Mariage 
– Parents/ children
 
 
Number of persons
the year 2000
All farmers 
(IAHS broad defintion)
• 75 281 households
• 194 223 household members
IAHS narrow definition
• 18 613 households
• 48 221 household members
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Incomes 1999-2001
Average per household SEK
2001 2000 1999
Income from employment 235 200 226 400 215 300
Income from business 51 200 45 900 40 600
Income from capital 22 900 29 000 30 400
of which interest adjustment (19 700) (18 600) (16 300)
Summary incomes 309 300 301 300 286 300
General deductions 4 300 4 200 3 600
Change in expansion funds -1 200 -1 700 -600
Summary others 3 100 2 500 3 000
Positve taxfree transfers 11 400 10 700 9 500
Negative transfers -101 600 -104 000 -102 400
Summary transfers -90 200 -93 300 -92 900
Income after transfers 216 000 205 500 190 400
 
 
Share of incomes 2001
Employment
76%
Business
23%
Capital
1%
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Incomes 2001
Incomes
Employ
ment
Business Capital Summary
Regions
RO 1 223 073 65 512 26 372 314 957
RO 2 239 686 40 856 21 509 302 051
RO 3 256 065 38 801 17 256 312 122
Arabel land ha 
    2,1-    5,0 292 809 7 335 4 491 304 635
    5,1-  10,0 281 723 9 537 9 391 300 651
  10,1-  20,0 255 275 21 717 16 053 293 045
  20,1-  30,0 226 042 45 515 25 500 297 057
  30,1-  50,0 190 360 81 371 36 172 307 903
  50,1-100,0 160 088 129 634 43 922 333 644
100,1-200,0 156 232 158 436 54 041 368 709
200,1- 146 376 192 391 66 775 405 542
 
 
Incomes 2001
Incomes
Employ
ment
Business Capital Summary
Type of farming
Field crops 251 175 49 005 27 089 327 269
Horticultural plants 211 863 72 119 20 778 304 760
Field crops+ horticultural 
plants 184 720 94 356 31 323 310 399
Dairy cows 119 020 138 148 40 189 297 357
Beef cattle 238 774 34 056 24 154 296 984
Cattle 131 090 109 320 41 002 281 412
Other animals 267 501 41 406 16 259 325 166
Mixt farming mostly field 
crops 217 768 63 740 32 329 313 837
Mixted farming mostly 
animals 215 254 57 334 28 047 300 635
Farmers age
30-39 år 220 471 56 074 5 732 282 277
40-49 år 253 322 68 579 16 279 338 180
50-64 år 258 086 58 456 27 164 343 706
65-    år 174 128 9 739 37 705 221 572
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Advantages / 
Disadvatanges
Advantages
– Inexpensive
– All population 
– Consistent material
Disadvantages
– Biased beceause of another 
purpose
– No control of changes
– Definitions not useful
 
 
TAPAS-project
Merge 
– FADN (1000 holdings)
– Income variables
Aditional questions of business -
activities (complementary activities)
To achieve…
– Overview of household incomes 
for FADN-holdings
– Test posibilities for colecting 
aditional data
– Improve quality on 
FADN-data
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3. Classification and economic results of part time and full 
 time farms using taxation data 
 
 
Maija Puurunen and Risto A. Seppälä 1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Classification of farms and farmers based on the line of business can be problematic, be-
cause farmers often engage in many kinds of non-farming work. The ratio between farm 
and non-farm business varies a great deal, ranging from occasional contract work for a 
neighbour to full-time paid employment outside the farm. This paper is focused on analys-
ing the differences between farms in income structure and labour input. Such differences 
can be revealed by grouping farms in quite a traditional way, using a certain income struc-
ture to indicate the farm's type. In order to get a more sophisticated picture of farm 
groupings, multivariate methods, i.e. factor and cluster analyses, are used to classify the 
farms. 
 Empirical data of the study was obtained by combining data from large databases 
containing financial data and farm structure data from the year 2000. Statistics Finland col-
lected financial data from taxation by means of a large sample of farms. The combined 
data consists of data from farm taxation (the Enterprise and Income Statistics of Agricul-
ture and Forestry MYTT) and from personal taxation of the same sample. Farm structure 
and labour input data were based on the Agricultural Census and other sources maintained 
by the Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Tike). The com-
bined data comprised over 7,900 farms, which had two or more field hectares and were 
owned by private persons. Farms owned by joint owners, corporations, communities, etc. 
were excluded from the study. In 2000 the total number of Finnish farms over two hectares 
was 78,200 (in 2003 72,700), of which about 88% were owned by private persons. 
 
 
3.2 Farmers' income development in different farm groups 
 
In Finland, during last fifteen years the real value of agricultural income of an average 
farm has not changed, although the farm size has nearly doubled (figure 3.1). Statistics 
Finland has traditionally classified part-time and full-time farms to four classes according 
to the share of agriculture and farm forestry in total income (shares are roughly 0-25%, 25-
50%, 50-75% and 75-100%). This farm grouping has been used also in the income studies 
made at the MTT Economic Research (Puurunen 1990, Väre 2000, 2003, Hirvi 2004, Sep-
pälä 2004). On so called free-time-farms the share of agricultural and forestry income is 
under 25% of the total income of farmer and spouse, on part time farms 25-50%, on sub-
sidiary farms 50-75% and on full-time farms over 75%. In 2001 group of the free-time 
                                                 
1 MTT Economic Research, Finland. 
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farms was about one third and full-time farms 40% of the farms. Groups of the part-time 
and subsidiary farms were about same size, both about 16% of farms. Earlier the share of 
the full-time farms was essentially bigger (figure 3.2-3.3). 
 The level of total income of farm families (here farmer and spouse) has increased 
mainly by means of salary income. In 1990s free-time farmers as well as part-time farmers 
were able to rise their total income by means of wages and salaries, but the income level of 
subsidiary farms and full-time farms has varied from year to year without any clear direc-
tion according to the production conditions (figure 3.4). Changes in the support system of 
agriculture and rise of costs will threaten especially the income development of subsidiary 
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Figure 3.1 Gross return of agriculture divided into farm income and costs in 1986-2001, real values in 
1995 level 
Source: Väre 2000, 2004. 
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Figure 3.2 Number of farms according to the share of agricultural and forestry income form total 
income of farmer and spouse in 1986-2001 
Source: Väre 2000, 2004. 
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Figure 3.3 Farm grouping according to the share of agricultural and forestry income, percent of all farms 
Source: Väre 2000, 2004. 
 
 
farms and full-time farms. Most of them are animal husbandry farms, whose income de-
velopment is mainly dependent on agricultural income. Many of them have invested 
heavily to their production, and although they have got some support for the investments, 
they have to keep care of the mortgages. 
 In 2000 the depths for agricultural production of full-time farms were about three 
times the farm income plus deprecations and 1.8 times the total net income of farmer and 
spouse plus deprecations. On part- time farms agricultural depths were correspondingly 1.7 
times the farm income and 0.7 times the total net income. From the year 1995 quantity of 
the depths compared to the total net income has decreased on the part-time farms, but due 
to the investments and stagnated income development it has increased on the full-time 
farms. On the full-time farms amortisation of debts can only be done from the agricultural 
income or from the forestry income. 
 
 
3.3 Farmers' income development compared with other population groups 
 
When the agricultural income of an average full-time farmer and spouse per head is com-
pared to the salary income of a full-time industrial worker, in the middle of 1980s to the 
middle of 1990s the comparison figures varied between 65-80%. After that development of 
the salary income of industrial workers has continued its rise steadily and farmers' income 
has hampered on its low level. In 2001 the agricultural income of full-time farmers was 
61% and primary income (i.e. entrepreneurial income total and wages) 73% of the wage 
income of industrial workers (figure 3.5). The comparison includes the whole agricultural 
income, although it is compensation not only for the agricultural work of farmer and 
spouse but also for the capital of agricultural production (Väre 2000, 2004). 
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 In addition to the industrial workers, the income development of farmers has been 
compared to that of other entrepreneurs. The comparison included also incomes other than 
the agricultural and wage income as well as the size of the household. The Income Distri-
bution Statistics (Statistics Finland) contain data on the incomes of different population 
groups and their changes, structure and distribution. Population in the statistics consists of 
private households. In 2001 the number of these was about 2.38 million. The number of all 
farmer households was about 83,200, and that of farmer households, where the socio-
economic position of the reference person is self-employed in agriculture (i.e. the main 
sector comprising agriculture, game, forestry and fisheries), was 46,700. Part-time farmers 
are included in other population groups in terms of their socio-economic position. 
 In the Income Distribution Statistics the main key figure is disposable income. This 
is obtained by summing up the wage income, entrepreneurial income (agriculture, forestry, 
business, occupation and coalition) and property income (rent, interest, dividends) and in-
come transfers (pensions and other social benefits) and deducting the paid income transfers 
from these (taxes, social security payments, other payments). 
 Because farmer households are somewhat larger than other households, the compari-
son based on households does not take into account the size of households. Thus incomes 
are compared according to consumer units (cu). In the method applied by the OECD, the 
first adult corresponds to 1 cu, the other adults to 0.7 cu and children under 18 years to 
0.5 cu. In 2000 there were 2.5 cu in farmer households, 2.1 cu in other entrepreneurs' 
households and 1.9 cu in the households of industrial workers. The disposable income of 
farmer households per person and consumer unit has been about the same as in the house-
holds of industrial workers but clearly smaller than in other entrepreneurs' households 
(figure 3.6) (Väre 2003, 2004). 
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Figure 3.4 Total income of farmer and spouse (euros/person) in the farm groups based on the share of ag-
ricultural and forestry income of the total income in 1990-2001 
Source: Väre 2004. 
 21
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Wage income of industrial
w orkers
Agricultural income/person on
average
Primary income/person on
average
Agricultural income/person on
full-time farms
Primary income/person on full-
time farms
1990=100
 
 
Figure 3.5 Income development of farmers and industrial workers in 1990-2001 
Source: Väre 2004. 
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Figure 3.6 Disposable income of farmer households compared with industrial workers and entrepreneurs, 
income per household, person and consumer unit in 1990-2001 
Source: Väre 2004. 
 
 
3.4 Analysis of the income structure and labour input of Finnish farmers 
 
3.4.1 All farms owned by private persons 
 
When the share of agricultural income increases, the growth of total income becomes more 
moderate and yearly variation is greater. The variation of agricultural income from one 
year to another complicated the grouping of part-time and full-time farms according to in-
come data alone. To exclude the effect of yearly variation of agricultural income, the 
income data of Statistics Finland was combined with the labour input data of the Agricul-
tural Census of Tike (Seppälä 2004). Multivariate methods were applied to the data of the 
year 2000 for grouping the farms and finding out the different farm types. According to the 
results, the type of each major income source formed a farm cluster of its own. A total of 
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22 farm groups were chosen for further analysis. The main features of the farm groups are 
presented in the table 3.1. Some of the smallest farm groups are brought together. The in-
come structure of farm groups is presented in the figure 3.7. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Structural information of the farm clusters 
 
 
 % of farms Animals LU Arable area Forest area 
 
 
Other farms 30.2 5.0 19 33 
Salary earners 23.9 1.4 15 26 
Farm forest 1 and 2  5.4 7.9 31 153 
Pluriactive farms 1 and 2 1.3 9.3 33 56 
Vegetables 0.6 4.5 37 37 
Sugar beet 1, 2 and 3 2.6 11.2 47 43 
Potato 1 and 2 1.6 5.0 42 43 
Grain 5.8 4.4 79 46 
Poultry 0.2 215.3 55 40 
Pig 3 and 4 0.7 163.2 64 49 
Pig 1 and 2 2.1 68.1 45 41 
Beef 1 and 2 2.8 39.1 47 60 
Milk 2 5.0 44.4 57 57 
Milk 1 16.4 23.6 31 53 
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Figure 3.7 Structure of the total income of farmer and spouse in the farm clusters in 2000 
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 The multivariate methods used in the study produced a farm grouping where the in-
come structure with production line had a major role. The group of salary earners' farms 
was nearly one quarter of all farms, milk farms were one fifth and unspecialised other 
farms with low total income 30% of the farms. Number of livestock units was biggest in 
the poultry and pig farms and number of field hectares was biggest in the grain farms. Al-
though nearly all the farms have some forest, forestry was a sorting factor in two of the 
chosen farm groups, which together were about 5% of the farms. Total income was lowest 
in the group of unspecialised farms. Also milk and beef farms had lower total income than 
in other farm groups (table 3.1 and figure 3.7). Inspect of the low income level the average 
labour input of agriculture was very high in the milk farms. Also most of the unspecialised 
other farms with low total income had very high labour input in agriculture (figure 3.8). 
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Figure 3.8 Labour input in agriculture in average and 80% of variation in the farm clusters 
 
 
 Farmer's and spouse's participating in agriculture was studied separately in respect of 
income structure and labour input use in agriculture. The year 2000 was quite a normal 
year, which is why the average labour input in the clusters was well in line with the income 
structure. Here the farm grouping was based merely on the share of agricultural income 
from total income of farmer and spouse. Farmer and spouse got scores from one to four for 
the agricultural income share and for the labour input in agriculture. Results were com-
bined on farm level as a full-time index. In the index the scores from the share of income 
were stressed by one third and the scores from the share of labour input by two third. The 
share of income and labour input in the classification of farms was tested by the bookkeep-
ing data of FADN-farms in an exceptional bad year 1998 and in a fairly good year 2000. 
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When the share of income was about 30% and thus the share of labour input about 70% in 
the index, the classification was most stable and only few farms changed their position be-
tween the part time farm groups and the full time farm groups. 
 The full time farm index of the farmer got the values over 90% on the animal hus-
bandry farm groups and on some bigger plant growing farm groups. For spouses the full 
time index got values over 60% in most animal husbandry farm groups. In the other farm 
groups the index was mostly over 60% for farmers but less for spouses. For the whole farm 
the full time index was an average of the full time indexes of farmer and spouse (fig-
ure 3.9). 
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Figure 3.9 Full-time index of farms, farmer and spouse in the farm clusters 
 
 
3.4.2 Farms owned by young farmers 
 
The young farmers' farms were analyzed also by means of multivariate methods (Hirvi, 
2004). In the young farmers' study the clustering was made separately in the milk farms, 
pig farms and grain farms. In 2000 there were 2,055 farms owned by natural persons under 
40 years of age in the MYTT. In 2000 the total number of Finnish farmers under 40 years 
of age was 18,300, i.e. under one quarter of farmers. On dairy, pig and cereal farms the av-
erage arable area of young farmers was larger than that of older farmers. Young farmers 
were more heavily indebted than older farmers, especially in milk and pig production (fig-
ure 3.10). 
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Figure 3.10 Income structure of farms according to farmer's age in 2000 
Source: Hirvi 2004. 
 
 
 According to the clustering of young farmers' farms, there were six dairy farm 
groups which gained over 75% of their total income from agriculture and farm forestry and 
two groups which gained 50-75% of their total income from agriculture and farm forestry. 
Two groups of pig farms gained over 75% and two groups 50-75% of their total income 
from agriculture and farm forestry. One group of cereal farms had below 25%, two groups 
25-50% and one group 50-75% of their total income from agriculture and farm forestry 
(figure 3.11). The farms with the income share of over 50% were the most heavily depend-
ent on agricultural income as well as agricultural policy and aids. They were also the most 
indebted because of the transfer of the farm to the next generation, investments and other 
development measures undertaken on the farm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Income structure in the farm clusters in milk, pig and cereal farms of young farmers 
Source: Hirvi 2004. 
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3.5 Income studies and the FADN 
 
Many goals of the Common Agricultural Policy refer to such income development of far-
mers which is comparable and somehow in line with the income development of other 
population. As for the CAP, most attention is paid to the agricultural income, but e.g. in the 
evaluation of the effects of rural development programmes the Commission has stated in-
dicators which require comparisons of total income between farm families and other rural 
population. As for the rural development it is important to examine the whole income for-
mation of farmer population, for especially on the smaller farms the livelihood of farm 
family is collected from many sources. The income comparisons presuppose reliable statis-
tics and data concerning income level and structure of different population groups. Also 
unify income concepts are necessary for the comparisons. 
 The FADN-system is the most detailed and best possible statistics for studying the 
level of farm income and its development in different EU-countries. Profitability concepts 
of agriculture depend on how well the labour input and value of agricultural property are 
determined in the data source. In the FADN the full-time farming is partly determined by 
means of the minimum demand for the farm size. In Finland the data of bookkeeping farms 
has included the concept of total income of farm family. However, during last years data 
collection of the Finnish bookkeeping farms was reduced concerning salary income and 
private consumption of farm family. Although the Finnish bookkeeping includes the data 
of entrepreneurial income from three different branch of industry on the farm, the farms 
cannot be grouped according to the part-time/full-time dimension. Finally, the question is 
about the needs and possibilities to use the FADN-data only for the implementation of ag-
ricultural policy, or, on the other hand, to expand the FADN to cover the concept of total 
income of farm families for the research of different income sources and other needs of ru-
ral policy. 
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4. Developments in the organisation of the farm and their 
 policy implications 
 
 
Krijn J. Poppe, Hennie van der Veen, Karel van Bommel and Walter van Everdingen 1 
 
Abstract 
 
Decisions are influenced by reference concepts, which have a risk that decision makers fix 
too much on such anchors that are by now outdated. This could also be the case with the 
implicit ideas policy makers have on the characteristic of a farm and the relation with the 
farm family. 
 The traditional reference on e.g. a dairy farm in Western-Europe is one farm family 
with the spouse working part-time on the farm, part-time in the farm family household. 
They joined the farm of their parents directly after their school years and the farmer took it 
over after a number of years, when his father retired. 
 Especially many dairy farms still fit into this classical reference of the family farm. 
However a lot of other farms do not. Many farming operations, at least in the Netherlands, 
are now much more complicated. Some have moved into other enterprises than traditional 
farm activities (including nature management, health care, tourism). Some have more than 
one location for their operation, or as some would say: own two farms. In plant production 
there are several farms that rent land in or out at a seasonal basis, to be able to specialize 
and reach efficiencies of scale in one crop. Many farms have now two or three farm opera-
tors/entrepreneurs. These are often father-son or spouses combinations, be it for fiscal or 
emancipation reasons. This can involve only one, sometimes two or even more households. 
This can involve situations in which for fiscal or other legal purposes the farm-as-you-see-
it is split up in two or three 'companies'. Farmers and their spouses are also more integrated 
in the regional labour market, having an off-farm income source, in the capital market and 
receive social security transfers. And last but not least, the 'modern farms' are not only 
more complicated, but also much more dynamic over time than often thought. 
 This paper describes the difference between the old and the new reference concept of 
the farm, and the relationship with the farm families and the households by using entity-
relationship data diagrams. This clearly shows how much more complicated farms are or-
ganised today, compared with the reference model used in current agricultural statistics 
(like the Farm Structure Survey and the FADN/RICA). 
 Based on these models, we provide - as far as possible with current statistics - data 
on the Netherlands that shows how important the aspects discussed above are. We end with 
discussing the policy implications of this. Three major ones stand out. First of all for some 
types of agricultural policy there are no implications. For veterinary policy for instance the 
size and organisation of the activity is not relevant. The stamping out methods used in clas-
sical swine fever, food and mouth disease or avian influenza imply that every animal in a 
                                                 
1 LEI, The Hague (corresponding author: krijn.poppe@wur.nl). 
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region should be killed or vaccinated, including hobby animals with non-agricultural fami-
lies. For such policies it seems correct to call everybody a farmer that owns a sheep or 
grow some vegetables, even if they are not sold in the market. Secondly there are policies 
that are very much touched by having a correct reference of the modern farm. The Com-
mon Agricultural Policy with its objective to support the income of farmers is an important 
example. Here the implications range from having a good definition of a farm that is eligi-
ble for a (modulated) direct payment, to the (transfer) efficiency of the policy for farms and 
farmers that are much more complex and dynamically organised. Thirdly policy makers 
and researchers should have their public monitoring instruments (data sets, farm typolo-
gies) reframed to the new reference concept, to take into account the new reality of modern 
farming. 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This paper argues that it is time to update our reference of what a farm is. In section 4.2 we 
start from a behavioural economics perspective, that explains why references can become 
outdated. In section three we introduce data modelling, a technique from computer science 
to show the difference between the classic view of a farm and the more complicated con-
cept of today's farm. This is worked out in more detail in section 4.4, where we start with 
the current trends that shape the farm organisation. Section 4.5 provides some new data 
from the Netherlands that illustrates our model. We end with a discussion and conclusions. 
 
 
4.2 The role of references 
 
References play an important role in thinking and communication. Behavioural economics, 
as developed for instance by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman and others, learns us that 
decision makers make a number of systematic and predictable mistakes. Two of them are 
relevant here: the effect of self-experience and the anchor effect. 
 People put a lot of emphasis on things they have seen and experienced themselves, 
which may not be the best guide to decision making. In finance this leads to the 'home 
bias': the tendency of most investors to buy shares only in companies from the country they 
live in, even if they are aware of the advantages of diversification. In agricultural policy it 
might lead to imagine a farm as it was at the time that researchers and policy makers lived 
on or close to the farm of their relatives themselves. 
 This brings in the anchor effect. First encounters tend to be decisive, not only in 
making new contacts but also in contracts. Once a figure has been mentioned, e.g. a price 
quoted in a sale, it casts its shadows on new figures entered into the issue. 
 To improve decision making it is therefore not a bad thing to explicit our references 
from time to time. With regard to the (family) farm, this is nothing new. In an analysis of 
the concept of 'family farm' in the United States, Reinhardt and Barlett (1989) found that 
this concept was revised implicitly over time when new developments occurred. Originally 
the concept was used to describe a farm where all the inputs of labour and capital were 
provided by the farm's owning family: the land should be owned, as well as the other capi-
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tal, labour was provided by the family and no contractors were used. Over time these as-
sumptions were relaxed, as 'family farms' were renting land, using bank loans and hiring 
personnel and contractors to make efficient use of machinery. 
 
 
4.3 Modelling references 
 
A reference can be described in pictures or words. The traditional reference of a dairy farm 
in North-western Europe would be something like this: 
 
a number of farm buildings, often old and including a farmhouse and a more recently 
build cow shed for 40 cows. Five plots of land, in total 30 ha, surround the buildings. 
There is one farm family with the spouse working part-time on the farm, part-time in 
the farm family household. They joined the farm of their parents directly after their 
school years and the farmer took it over after a number of years, when his father re-
tired. 
 
 In information science techniques are available to describe such a reference in a data 
model, that can be used to create a database (e.g. Chen, 1976). A data model, in the form of 
an entity-relationship diagram, that could describe the example above, is given in fig-
ure 4.1. It shows to so-called Entity Types, that are things about which we would like to 
know something (that is record data): the farm & household, and the family members con-
nected to the farm. One farm household has one or more family members, and family 
members are related to each other. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Data model to describe traditional NW European dairy farms 
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 Compared to the reference data model in figure 4.1, those used in agricultural statis-
tics to inform policy makers and researchers are already a bit more complex. The 
FADN/RICA has a more elaborated data model than the Farm Structure Survey (FSS). 
Relevant parts are given in figure 4.2. 
 The data model in figure 4.2 shows that in this reference a farm is always located in 
one geographical location (village), that is located in one altitude-zone. It has one legal 
structure. The holding has one or more assets and liabilities and one or more activities, that 
are also used to classify the farm. For each holding data are gathered on a number of un-
paid (that is: family) workers that are connected to the farm. From these labourers a 
number of data elements (attributes) are collected. It also implies that some persons that 
work on the farm also have not only a 'working' relationship with the farm, but have also 
an 'ownership relation'. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Data model of FADN Farm Return (as far as relevant to describe the organisation of the fam-
ily farm) 
 
 
 A comparison between figure 4.1 and 4.2 learns us that the FADN describes a large 
number of issues relevant to the characteristics and organisation of the farm. The tradi-
tional view on the family farm is well supported. However some aspects, like households 
and off-farm activities have not been thought relevant in the past for agricultural policy 
making and research. Nor has been thought about more complex cases, like holdings that 
have operations at two locations, or have a complex legal structure. Or at least these have 
not been seen that relevant that obstacles in data gathering should be overcome. 
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4.4 The modern farm 
 
Farm organisation, and the relation between the farm family (families) and the farm has 
changed in the last years. Many interviews with farmers in the trade journals, as well as re-
search on multi-functionality (Huylenbroeck, 2003) show different aspects of this 
modernisation, and there are economic phenomena that explain these trends: 
- efficiency of scale: technological progress, be it in larger machines or information 
technology, helps to increase labour productivity and goes on to increase the optimal 
size of the farm. Some farmers have not only enlarged their farm by buying their 
neighbours' land, but bought a second or third holding elsewhere, sometimes even 
abroad. Two leading Dutch agricultural politicians are reported to have not only 
farms in the Netherlands but also elsewhere; 
- forward or backward integration: some farmers buy a second farm to integrate for-
ward or backward in the production column, to cut out transaction costs. Examples 
are in pig breeding/fattening or in plant nursery. For technical/veterinary reasons this 
second farm is often at a different location (sometimes even in Kenia in the case of 
horticulture); 
- diversification in agricultural niche markets: some farmers choose the strategy not to 
enlarge their current operation (only), but to take on new business activities related to 
the farm. Examples are in food processing and retail, nature management, agri-
tourism, agri-health care etc.; 
- diversification into an off-farming job. In farms that are no longer able to compete in 
the treadmill of lower margins per unit of production and larger production units, it 
can be attractive to join the labour market and take a part-time job. Some agricultural 
activities can be combined rather easily with another activity in a part-time approach 
(e.g. poultry fattening or cereal growing) as they are not necessarily a day- or year 
round activity. In case of the farmers' spouse, it can be attractive not to join farm 
work at all, but to stay in her own profession, to reap the benefits of the investment 
(sunk cost) in human capital; 
- diversification of investment outside agriculture: if it becomes clear that the farm 
probably has no successor, or if no attractive investment opportunities are available, 
it is attractive to invest cash flows generated by the farm outside the farm. Besides 
capital this also can include unused buildings for non-agricultural use (e.g. renting 
them out to store caravans or to house a car repair shop); 
- some of the new developments are the result of a combination of these trends (e.g. 
investing ones money and time in an on-farm tourism activity). 
 
 All these developments relate to the central problem of economic organisations: ad-
aptation. Williamson (2003) reminds us that these adaptations can be reflected in either 
autonomous adaptations in which individual parties respond to market opportunities as 
signalled by chances in relative prices (as an economist like Hayek would do), or can be 
seen as cooperative adaptations accomplished trough administration within the firm (as the 
organisational theorist Barnard would do). Williamson states that a high performance eco-
nomic system will display adaptive capacities of both kinds. Thus an understanding and 
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appreciation of both markets and hierarchies (in our case: farm-household complexes) are 
needed. 
 Many of the developments discussed above, are not totally new. The treadmill of the 
cost squeeze and the fact that the structure of the farm industry lags the optimal farm size, 
is an old characteristic of the sector. Part-time farming has been around in some regions 
like Bavaria for several generations. On farm cheese making and other forms of food proc-
essing and retail are also old. 
 New about this pluriformity is probably that the CAP now provides more incentives 
and need for entrepreneurship - as the support for standardized bulk products and produc-
tion processes slowly disappears. Farmers and their families are now also more integrated 
into society. Transport and communication costs have come down. Where farmers 50 years 
ago dominated rural societies, they then formed for a long time a group large enough to 
club together in local associations and at parties. In many European regions villages and 
cities are now so close, that farmers just have another profession, and are integrated in the 
society at large. Which makes economic integration easier. 
 This raises the question: what is nowadays a farm? Is a dairy farm that realises 51% 
of its income from agri-tourism still a dairy farm, or even a farm at all? At least in national 
accounts it would not be a farm but a tourist business. If a Dutch pig breeder buys a second 
farm for pig fattening in a village at 50 km distance, does he then have one or two farms? 
And if the second operation is in Belgium? Is a 75 year old farmer that earns 80% of his 
income from a pension, still a farmer? And if he is 40 and earns 80% from a job in the vil-
lage? Or even 110% and spends 10% as a loss making operation on the farm as it gives 
him the right to live in the country side and brings entitlements to social security? 
 Of course we could try to make new definitions of a farm, a farmer and a family 
farm. No science without proper definitions, to build common references for our commu-
nication. 
 However it is at the moment more attractive to find out more in detail what is hap-
pening on the farm with respect to farm organisations. This can be done by updating the 
data model and use it for an inventory. 
 To support this fact finding we developed and propose a new reference data model 
(figure 4.3). It describes the farm - farm household complex. The model is based on earlier 
discussions in the PACIOLI-group (Poppe, 2004) and the data model implemented in the 
new software for the Dutch FADN (Poppe, 2001). The proposed data definitions are given 
in figure 4.4. 
 Central in this data model is the agricultural holding as our unit of interest. However, 
as economists, we propose to give the farm an economic definition. That implies that an 
agricultural holding, like any other business, can have more than one location. As long as 
decision making on a location of the farm is influenced by developments on another loca-
tion (e.g. by sharing capital or labour, or by integrated production), it is one holding. There 
are only two farms or holdings in those cases where operations at different locations do not 
share resources, and are only linked because they have the same owner (and his capital is 
not an extremely scarce resource). Thus, holdings can have more than one location. And 
some locations (if not defined too narrowly) can host more than one holding (e.g. a busi-
ness like a consultancy that is run by the spouse of the farmer that is not in any way 
integrated with the farm). 
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Figure 4.3 Reference data model for the modern farm - farm household complex (changes over time not 
explicitly modelled in) 
 
 
Entity Type Definition 
Agricultural holding Commercial operation that is involved in agricultural activities, what-
ever its size and its locations and legal structures, as long as it sells 
agricultural produce, and the different activities in the holding (and lo-
cations) have a joint use of resources like labour, capital or 
management. 
Natural person Any person that is connected to the farm or the farm household, be it as 
a worker, owner or living in the household that has part of its income 
from management and investment activities in an agricultural holding 
Household A group of persons that lives together in a regular way, e.g. by living 
under one roof and consuming a number of meals a week together 
Location Place that can be identified geographically 
Legal structure A juridical title used to run a commercial operation 
Activity Production line within a holding (e.g. growing of sugar beet, keeping 
beef cattle, making cheese). 
Off farm income source An origin of a revenue (salary, investment income, pension, etc.) for a 
natural person other than income from the agricultural holding in which 
one is active, or non agricultural business income. 
Non agricultural business Commercial operation that is not involved in agricultural activities 
Assets and liabilities Items that are owned and obligations that a business has. 
Figure 4.4 Definitions for the reference data model presented in figure 3.3 
(Agricultural) Hold-
ing 
- Name 
- Number 
Natural Person 
- Name 
- Family relation 
- Year of birth 
Household 
- Name 
Works at
Lives 
in 
Legal structure 
- Legal form 
Location 
- GIScode
- ZIPcode
Assets and Li-
abilities 
- Name 
- Value Activity 
- Size (ha) 
- Turnover €
- Period Classification/ 
Typology 
- Farm type 
Non-agr. 
Business 
- type 
Off farm in-
come source 
- Type 
- Regular y/n 
- Income in € 
OwnsFamily relation 
- Type 
Type of legal form eg: 
Partnership, co-
operative, individual 
Owns
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 An agricultural holding has a legal structure. Sometimes it has more than one. A 
quite common example from the Netherlands is the farm where there is a legal father-son 
partnership that runs the operations, and where part of the land is owned by the father as 
his private business and rented out to the partnership. And sometimes the son is likewise 
the owner of recently bought milk quota. In fiscal terms there are then three operations 
with their own fiscal income calculation. Legally and fiscally speaking, it is the legal struc-
ture (including the private business of a person) that owns the assets and liabilities. 
 Agricultural holdings perform activities, like growing crops, keeping animals. But 
they can also include diversified activities like agri-tourism, food processing, retail, nature 
management, health care, forestry, contracting of machinery or even activities that do not 
have a synergy with agriculture or the rural environment. In central Europe some large 
(former state) farms are still active in totally different business activities. And some farm-
ers are just using the legal structure of the farm for other gainful activities. As decision 
making in the farm is influenced by such activities (e.g. labour saving strategies or invest-
ments), it would be a mutilation of reality if such activities would not be accounted for. 
 The traditional agricultural activities are used to classify farms in farm types and size 
classes, like dairy farms, olive farms and mixed farms, or small and large farms. 
 Behind the agricultural holding are persons. They work at the farm or own the farm. 
Some persons only work on the farm and are not a part of the farm family or its house-
holds. Those are called personnel and provide the external labour input. Although the CAP 
states that is aimed at all that work in agriculture, in policy analysis they are often not dealt 
with in detail. 
 Natural persons that own the farm are the farmer/owners. It is attractive to know their 
family relationship. Many farms nowadays have more than one farmer/owner. In the Neth-
erlands this used to be father/son partnerships, to make the (fiscal) transfer of the farm to 
the next generation easier. Over the last ten years the importance of farmer/spouse partner-
ships has increased very much, which has a fiscal (and originally emancipatory) 
background. 
 Unrelated to this ownership structure, family members are a member of a household. 
Especially the next generation can be working on the farm or be partly owner, and (still) 
live in his/her parents’ household, or can have started a household of his own. Needless to 
say that households can have members that work on the farm, but are not an owner. Which 
implies that the family farm income has to support several workers. It is equally possible 
that some households have members with an off-farm job, or another fixed income source 
like a pension, social security payments or revenues from capital investments. It could also 
be that he/she runs a self-employed business (through an independent legal structure) that 
is totally separated from the agricultural holding. 
 The composition of the household brings us to the issue of time. We should realise 
that also in the agricultural sector relationships are not that stable anymore. Children leav-
ing the household to live on their own and marriage are nothing new. In the last 15 years 
however also cohabitation (not necessarily for a long period) and divorces have come to 
the farming community. In some cases this can have large effects on wealth. 
 Not only households, but also legal structures change quite often. Where in the Neth-
erlands today about 4% of the farms disappears every year, we found out in analysis for the 
implementation of the new CAP that every year about 10% of the farms experience 
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changes in legal title (mainly due to entry or exit of partners and intra-generational trans-
fer). 
 In addition to the traditional farm typology to characterise agricultural holdings, fig-
ure 4.3 suggests some other interesting typologies, that are probably just as relevant: 
- a typology of agricultural holdings to the degree in which they are active in crop pro-
duction, animal husbandry and the list of diversified activities mentioned above 
(agri-tourism etc.) 
- a typlogy of households involved in ownership of agricultural holdings, to the degree 
in which the household members are involved in agricultural holdings with tradi-
tional agriculture, with diversified activities, in a non-agricultural self-employed 
business, have a job elsewhere or have another fixed income source. The USDA-
ERS has started to move their farm typology in this direction (e.g. Mishra, 2002). 
One of the types of large farms is the category of non-family farms. Under the small 
family farms they classify as separate entries the Retirement farms (operator is re-
tired and does not have an income lower than $ 20.000,- a year, as this would make it 
a limited-resource farm) and the Residential/lifestyle farm (where the operator re-
ports a major occupation other than farming). 
 
 
4.5 Some data from the Netherlands 
 
As agricultural statistics find it hard to innovate and adapt to new realities (Abitabele, 
1999) it is not easy to provide empirical data on the theoretical reference model. However 
the renewed FADN system in the Netherlands partly fills the gap. Some warnings should 
be given in advance. We report here data on 2001, the first year this data was gathered. Ga-
thering new types of data starts often with problems and anomalies. And incentives exist 
for data collectors to leave the most complicated cases (e.g. holdings with subsidiaries 
abroad, or with large retail shops) out of the data collection. To avoid the impression that 
we can provide at this moment representative data for the Netherlands as a whole, we have 
not calculated weighted averages and a percentage distribution. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Agricultural holdings classified to the number of entrepreneurs per holding in the Netherlands, 
2001 
 
 
Agricultural holding with… Number of holdings 
 
 
1 entrepreneur 334 
2 entrepreneurs 382 
3 entrepreneurs 70 
4 entrepreneurs 19 
5 entrepreneurs 2 
  
Total  807 
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 That having said, table 4.1 shows that the number of holdings with one entrepreneur 
seems to be a minority. The classic example that we described at the start of this paper, the 
farm with the male farmer/father being the only owner/manager is clearly not a good refer-
ence anymore. 
 Table 4.2 provides data on the relationship between the agricultural holding and the 
number of households that it supports. It shows that the number of cases with two or even 
more households per farm, are numerous, but the classic reference of one household per 
farm is still the overwhelming majority. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Agricultural holdings classified to the number of households per holding in the Netherlands, 
2001 
 
 
Agricultural holding with… Number of holdings 
 
 
1 household 703 
2 households 80 
3 households 18 
4 or more households 6 
  
Total 807 
 
 
 
 
 The combination of tables 4.1 and 4.2 implies that in many cases the entrepreneurs 
are living together in one household, be it as a father-son, man-wife or man-wife-child 
family relationship (table 4.3). In households with more entrepreneurs the age of the oldest 
entrepreneur is higher, indicating a number of parent-child (classic: father-son) partner-
ships to transfer the farm to the next generation. These farms are also larger (in terms of 
European Size Units). 
 
 
Table 4.3 Agricultural holdings classified to the number of households and the number of entrepreneurs 
per holding in the Netherlands, 2001 
 
 
Agricultural holding with… Number of holdings Persons from the 
  households involved 
  in the farm 
 
 
1 household, 1 entrepreneur 333 1.7 
1 household, 2 entrepreneurs 321 2.3 
1 household, 3 or more entrepreneurs 53 3.5 
2 households, 2 entrepreneurs 57 2.8 
Others (more households, more entrepreneurs) 43 3.8 
   
Total  807 2.2 
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 It shows in table 4.4 that most agricultural holdings are located at one site. As in a 
number of cases there are incentives in Dutch agricultural regulations as well as for our 
data collectors not to consolidate operations in two locations into one holding (although la-
bour, capital and management are shared, and products are moved from one holding to the 
other), in reality the share of holdings with more than one location is higher. It is also 
hardly surprising that a large number of holdings is not using the agricultural VAT system 
(in which a forfait is used in stead of a normal VAT accounting system) anymore (ta-
ble 4.6). Moving fertilizers and pesticides from the low VAT rate of 6% to the high one of 
19% has contributed to the fact that many farmers adopted the normal VAT system, in 
which paid VAT can be deducted. With the unexpected effect that the marginal tax rate on 
these inputs dropped in stead of increased. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Agricultural holdings classified to the number of geographical locations per holding in the 
Netherlands, 2001 
 
 
Agricultural holding with… Number of holdings 
 
 
1 location 796 
2 locations 10 
3 locations 1 
  
Total  807 
 
 
 
 
 Farms are nowadays organised in different juridical forms (table 4.5). Most popular 
is the (fiscal) partnership in which two, three or more entrepreneurs are working together. 
The classic one-man-business is second. More official forms like the limited company or 
the limited partnership are also often present. 
 
 
Table 4.5 Agricultural holdings classified to their juridical form, the Netherlands, 2001 
 
 
Juridical form Number of holdings 
 
 
One-man-business 264 
Partnership 428 b) 
Limited partnership a) 79 
Limited company 36 
  
Total  807 
 
 
a) In Dutch: V.o.F. and C.V.; b) Data under review. 
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Table 4.6 Agricultural holdings classified to the VAT system adopted, the Netherlands, 2001 
 
 
VAT system Number of holdings 
 
 
Agricultural forfait system 348 
Normal VAT accounting system 459 
  
Total  807 
 
 
 
 
Typology 
 
Traditional typologies classify farms in types arable farms, dairy farms etc. and into size 
classes measured in European Size Units. Inspired by the USDA-ERS, in table 4.7 we in-
troduce a new typology for dairy farms, based on the scale and potential future 
development of the farm. We create three classes: 
1. large farms: farms with more than 100 dairy cows; 
2. modal farms: farms with less than 100 dairy cows where the farm is the primary 
source of income for the household and the head of the farm is younger then 55 years 
or has a successor; 
3. other farms, essentially retiring farmers and part-time farmers. The farm is run as a 
part time farm or the head of the farm is over 55 years without a successor. 
 
 
Table 4.7 Results of dairy farms, 1990 and 1999 
 
 
 1990 1999 
 total  
  total large scale modal other 
   farmers farmers farmers 
 
 
Number / % of farms 33,500 27,800 11% 79% 10% 
Share of production (%)  100 23 70 7 
Utilised area (ha) 29 33 66 30 26 
Milk quota per farm 318,200 398,600 846,000 350,700 280,400 
Dairy cows per farm 49 53 112 47 39 
Labour input (hours) 3,980 3,930 6,250 3,700 3,150 
Labour costs (€) 53,900 69,500 109,400 65,700 55,000 
of which calculated for family (%) 96 98 96 99 97 
Farm labour income of the family (€) 20,700 11,900 40,200 9,600 -1,200 
 
Per 100 kg milk 
Labour costs (€) 16.76 17.30 12.69 18.61 19.99 
Labour income (€) 7.06 3.27 5.23 2.90 0.17 
 
 
Source: Farm Accountancy Data Network.. 
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 Since 1990 the family labour income from dairy farming has decreased with almost 
50% to € 11,900, which is below the poverty level in the Dutch social security system. Es-
pecially the modal and other farms do not gain enough income from dairy farming. This 
shows that on average dairy farming is not economically viable in the Netherlands. There 
are different strategies to continue farming in the (near) future, the three main strategies are 
represented by the different types: 
- Large farms 
The large scale farmers, that supply nearly one quarter of the milk production, try to 
secure their income by growth and usually high labour productivity. The family 
works on the farm. They have a strategy of efficiency of scale, resulting in low cost 
per ESU. The labour costs per 100 kg of milk € 12.69 compared to € 18.61 for modal 
farmers. The large scale farmers have no capacity to work outside the farm, although 
sometimes the partner has a part-time job off farm. Their main strategy is to grow by 
investing in milk quota to reduce the cost price of the milk. They outsource more and 
more work to agricultural contractors. 
- Modal farmers 
The modal farmers usually have to compete with the large scale farmers. They have a 
focus on low costs. Often relative a high amount of family labour input is required. 
About 15% of these farmers are active in multifunctional agriculture. The margin per 
labour unit is usually lower than for the large scale farmers. Modal farmers gain of-
ten not enough income from the prime agricultural activity and therefore they move 
to multifunctional farming or sometimes organic farming. Compared to the large 
scale farmers, a larger proportion of their income is earned off farm. They usually 
compensate the low margins per hour by the amount of hours (60 to 80 hours a 
week). 
- Retiring farmers and part-time farmers 
For this group, farming is a way of live (the residential/lifestyle farm), although it 
does not provide them with a high enough income. The main income is usually off-
farm income. With farmers who are in the process of stopping, the farm is run down 
by reducing investments, consuming depreciation, and selling off parts of the farm. 
The residential farmers gain their income mainly off farm. They appreciate the living 
in the countryside and the farming can sometimes be considered as a large scale 
hobby. 
 
 The typology developed also helps to investigate structural changes. Figure 4.5 pro-
vides data for all Dutch holdings. In 2000 almost 12,000 holdings could be characterised as 
large farms (12% of the total farms). These farms supply about 43% of the Dutch agricul-
tural production. The modal farms are with 50% by far the largest group. The 38% of the 
farms that is classified in the group of other farms, are only responsible for 13% of the ag-
ricultural production. 
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Figure 4.5 Structural development of number of Dutch agricultural holdings, 1996-2000 
 
 
 The number of farms is reducing rapidly: in the period 1996-2000 the total number 
of farms reduced with 11%. In this period the share of large farms in the total number grew 
by 12%, because not many of these farms stopped and some larger modal farms developed 
into large farms. On the other side, some modal farms moved into the group of the other 
farms, because they became part-time farms or the farmer turned 55 years of age (without 
indicating that a successor was expected). The modal farms diminished by 17% and the 
other farms by 10%. Other shifts between groups occurred, but were limited. These shifts 
were mostly caused by changes in the availability of a successor. 
 
 
4.6 Discussion 
 
This paper suggests that, based on reports from trade journals and literature on multi-
functionality, it is time to update our reference on the definition of the farm and its rela-
tionship to the farm family. For this we developed a more complex data model that could 
fulfil this need. 
 This data model is not necessarily the only possible and the best reference for Euro-
pean farming. Testing it in data-gathering will learn that is has to be adapted to local 
circumstances (especially in fiscal and farm transfer issues). Where reality will show that 
in some aspects the data model is still too simple to reflect reality, in other aspects it can 
perhaps be simplified. This depends on results from using it. The case we would like to 
make here is that we should no longer be satisfied with the old reference model and move 
forward. 
 Some will like to raise the question why we should move. Perhaps especially also in 
France, where the public administration has for a long time been reluctant to collect data 
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on off-farm activities and income in e.g. the FADN system, worrying about boycotts by the 
private sector (Abitabile 1999). 
 A number of answers can be given to this question. First of all, it is also in the inter-
est of the private sector that decision making by policy makers is based on reality. And 
reality includes the new reference of the farm and its households. A clear example is that 
national governments in the EU use fiscal and legal policies to support their farm sector. If 
such policies are not disclosed in public data sets, it is impossible to monitor if competition 
stays fair. A second reason is that new policies (e.g. on cross compliance, new CAP, rural 
development) are introduced. To understand the effects of such policies, we need to take 
the whole array of opportunities and their risks and returns to farmers into account. Refer-
ring once again to Williamson (2003): we have to study the farm-household complex as 
well as the farm in the market, to understand and contribute to the high performance of the 
economic system. Otherwise policy research will be of limited value or even wrong. And 
that could lead to policy decisions that are against the interest of farmers. Del'homme 
(2000) made the point that farmers and their advisors also need relevant reference systems. 
And last but not least: the farm sector receives a lot of state support, now also in the form 
of direct subsidies with marginal obligations. The biggest beneficiaries are not the poorest 
members of the society, nor of the farm community. In the longer run it is even in the in-
terest of the sector in total to show that at least some of the beneficiaries are poor 
households and do not have significant income outside agriculture nor are very wealthy. If 
this transparency is not provided and the CAP not better targeted towards it, the pressure to 
abolish this type of CAP will grow even more. 
 We end with discussing the policy implications of this. Three major ones stand out. 
First of all for some types of agricultural policy there are no implications. For veterinary 
policy for instance the size and organisation of the activity is not relevant. The stamping 
out methods used in classical swine fever, food and mouth disease or avian influenza imply 
that every animal in a region should be killed or vaccinated, including hobby animals with 
non-agricultural families. For such policies it seems correct to call everybody a farmer that 
owns a sheep or grow some vegetables, even if they are not sold in the market. Secondly 
there are policies that are very much touched by having a correct reference of the modern 
farm. The Common Agricultural Policy with its objective to support the income of farmers 
is an important example. Here the implications range from having a good definition of a 
farm that is eligible for a (modulated) direct payment, to the (transfer) efficiency of the 
policy for farms and farmers that are much more complex and dynamically organised. 
Thirdly policy makers and researchers should have their public monitoring instruments 
(data sets, farm typologies) reframed to the new reference concept, to take into account the 
new reality of modern farming. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In a tradition of reframing our concepts of the family farm, this paper argues that we need 
to update our references of the farm and its relation to the farm households. Writing down 
our references in a data model helps to make our references clear and debatable. The new 
reference model developed here shows much more complexity than the old ones, as for ex-
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ample used in agricultural statistics. Further testing and data gathering is needed for fine 
tuning the reference at a European scale. First tests in the Netherlands support the model. 
We recommend the introduction of such a complex data model in national and the EU 
FADN systems. We also recommend a further development of new typologies of farm 
holdings and farm households, following the lead taken by the USDA-ERS in this respect. 
Where the new CAP is much less interested in particular agricultural crops and markets, 
and moves to a general level of support per hectare, technical details loose their importance 
in policy research and give way to analysing the incentives for resource allocation within 
the farm households. This asks for an adequate and up to date reference model. 
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5. The impact of enlargement and CAP reform to Latvian 
 farmers 
 
 
Dr.oec. Valda Bratka 1 
 
Abstract 
 
Accession of Latvia to the European Union may have a significant impact to the Latvian 
economy and particularly to agriculture. After accession the conditions for agricultural 
production and for further development will be closely linked with the implementation of 
Common Agricultural Policy. 
 At the end of 2002 Latvia signed Treaty of Accession with the EU, where the main 
general principles of accession and the results of negotiations concerning agriculture were 
fixed: production quotas, base areas, reference yield, the amounts of eligible rights of di-
rect payments, support level and phasing in up to level of the old member countries. On 
June 26, 2003 the Council of Agriculture Ministers of the European Union passed a resolu-
tion about common agricultural policy reform. Both these circumstances are expected to 
have a significant effect on the future of Latvian agricultural producers, and on their com-
petitiveness in the common European market. 
 Latvian State Institute of Agrarian Economics has carried out a study with the pur-
pose to estimate the effect of the said two processes on the agricultural sector as a whole, 
and on individual farm groups. The present paper presents the quantitative assessment of 
enlargement and CAP reform taking into account input and output price changes within the 
common EU market and support policy changes - effect of decoupling and modulation to 
different farm types based on Latvian 2001 FADN data. 
 Key words: enlargement, common agricultural policy (CAP), CAP reform, single 
area payment (SAP), modulation, quantitative analysis, farm net value added (NVA). 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Since May 1, 2004 Latvia is a full-fledged EU member country, and this will bring large 
changes to the Latvian economy. The changes are expected to effect agriculture as well: 
and not only in the connotation with the fact that the sector is joining the common Euro-
pean market, but also a result of the Common Agricultural policy reforms, providing the 
decoupling of support from production. How will these changes affect the farms in Latvia; 
which of the farm groups will benefit from the income increase after joining the EU; will 
there be any farm groups who will be losers from the changes? These are the questions 
keeping busy every single agricultural producer; they are also important for the Latvian so-
ciety in general, and largely defined the topic of the study. 
                                                 
1 Latvian State Institute of Agrarian economics. 
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 The EU-financed project, with the objective to evaluate the effects of enlargement 
and CAP reform on the agricultural sector of the new EU member states, to simulate possi-
ble development scenarios for different farm groups and to assess them, is already at the 
final stage. This is an evidence to the significance of the chosen research topic not only in 
the new member states but also in the entire enlarged Europe. The study has been carried 
out as a part of a thematic block of Enlargement Project, implemented by Institute for Pro-
spective Technological Studies. 
 The questions is topical not only for Latvia, but for all the new EU member states as 
well: upon the initiative of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Ministries of Agriculture, and 
in co-operation with the researchers in working in the area of agricultural economics, a 
study was carried out in order to assess the effects of the EU CAP Reform on the agricul-
tural and rural sector in the Baltic countries. The study evaluated the impact of the change 
of the policy on agricultural sector in general, employing methodology of economic ac-
counts for agriculture, using agriculture simulation model, also the changes in farm income 
as a result of agricultural policy changes for farms with different specialization were 
evaluated, using FADN data as a basis. 
 This paper describes the results of quantitative assessment of enlargement and CAP 
reform taking into account input and output price changes within the common EU market 
and support policy changes - effect of decoupling and modulation to different farm types 
based on Latvian 2001 FADN data. 
 
 
5.2 Materials and methods 
 
The study has been carried out using 350 Latvian FADN 2001 farm data, collected and 
classified, according to EU FADN methodology, accounting data from Latvian farms with 
different specialization, economic size and located in different regions of the country. The 
research is based on quantitative analysis - change in income as a result of Agenda 2000 
scenario and CAP Reform scenario, assuming that farm production structure, the output 
volume, production technology, technical support and labour input remain unchanged. The 
evaluation has been made for the below listed farm groups: 
- average farm; 
- field, mixed cropping farms; 
- grazing livestock farms; 
- granivores (pigs and poultry farms); 
- mixed farms. 
 
 Key data describing agricultural production in different farm groups are presented in 
table 5.1. 
 Entering the common EU market for agricultural products, the prices of output and 
input will change. Changes have been assessed comparing the prices in Latvia and in the 
EU countries located closer nearby, or having similar natural conditions. Price levels (ex-
cluding milk price, which will be reduced according to the decrease of target price for 
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Table 5.1 Main characteristics of agricultural production by type of farming 
 
 
 All farms Field, Grazing Pigs, Mixed 
  mixed livestock poultry farms 
  cropping 
 
 
Labour input, AWU 1.9 1.7 2.4 26.7 2.0 
Unpaid labour, AWU 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.8 
Economic size, ESU 4.3 4.5 5.9 200.7 3.6 
Agricultural Area, ha 35.7 36.3 51.3 72.5 34.3 
 Rented AA, ha 9.8 11.4 19.2 30.4 8.0 
Use of AA      
 Cereals, % 31.7 46.3 11.3 13.4 21.0 
 Potatoes, % 2.0 2.5 1.2 0.6 1.7 
 Sugarbeet, % 0.8 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Fodder crops, % 15.7 7.7 36.1 1.9 20.7 
 Pastures, meadows, % 24.4 18.5 46.2 4.7 27.4 
 Other use, % 15.7 20.4 3.3 14.3 12.8 
 Unused AA, % 9.8 2.8 1.9 65.1 16.3 
Livestock units 8.9 4.2 22.1 758.8 10.4 
Grazing livest.density, LU/ha 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 
Dairy cows, num. 4.0 1.4 14.4 0.8 5.6 
Other cattle, num. 4.3 2.2 14.1 0.3 5.7 
Pigs, num. 7.5 5.6 0.9 1,526.1 6.2 
Poultry, num. 52.8 12.6 5.1 37,517.7 10.0 
Yields      
 Wheat, t 2.8 3.1 2.2 3.2 2.3 
 Rye, t 2.0 2.0 1.4 4.5 2.0 
 Barley, t 1.9 1.8 1.9 3.0 1.9 
 Oats, t 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.0 
 Potatoes, t 13.9 14.1 12.3 14.1 13.8 
 Sugarbeet, t 30.7 30.7 - - 31.3 
 Milk, t 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.4 3.7 
 
 
Source: Latvian FADN 2001 data. 
 
 
milk1) have been forecasted equal for the whole simulation period from 2006 to 2013 and 
in both scenarios (table 5.2). 
 Milk price will be affected by the planned intervention price cuts for butter and skim 
milk powder; it will change depending on the scenario (table 5.3). 
 The increase of input prices has been observed already starting with the beginning of 
2004: to energy and fertilizers; together with the increase of agricultural output prices, also 
the price of seed and feed will increase. A significant price increase may be expected for 
services due to increase of labour costs (table 5.4). 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation 1999R1255 Article 3. 
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Table 5.2 Output price changes within common EU market, % 
 
 
Products Compared to 2001 
 
 
Wheat  15 
Rye 10 
Barley 14 
Oats 15 
Other cereals 10 
Rape seed 7 
Sugar beet 40 
Beef 23 
Pork  -1 
Poultry -5 
Sheep 20 
 
 
Source: LSIAE and author calculations based on EUROSTAT data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Milk price changes within common EU market, % 
 
 
 2006 From 2010 
 
 
Agenda 2000 65 54 
CAP Reform 37 34 
 
 
Source: Council Regulation EC No 1787/2003, LSIAE and author calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Input price changes, % 
 
 
Inputs Compared to 2001 
 
 
Seed 11 
Fertilizers, plant protection 10 
Other specific crop production 10 
Feed 7 
Insemination, veterinary costs 50 
Other specific livestock production 10 
Upkeep of machinery and buildings 10 
Fuel and lubricants 20 
Electricity, heating 35 
Services, machinery rental costs 20 
 
 
Source: LSIAE and author calculations. 
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 As a result of negotiations between Latvia and the EU, an agreement has been 
reached about the base areas, reference yield (2.5 tons per hectare), number of animals, 
premiums and quotas for the calculations of direct payments. The new Member States will 
gradually phase-in EU agricultural direct payments between 2004 and 2013. The direct 
payments will start with 25% from the direct payments rates applied in the EU in 2004, 
30% in 2005 and 35% in 2006 and will increase by 10 percent steps to reach 100% of the 
applicable EU level in 2013. Within the carefully defined limits, the new member states 
will have the option to 'top-up' these EU direct payments with national subsidies (ta-
ble 5.5). 
 
 
Table 5.5 Level of direct payments 2006 - 2013, sources of financing, % 
 
 
Year EU budget Rural development Latvia additional 
 
 
2006 35 5 25 
2010 70 0 30 
2013 100 0 0 
 
 
Source: Treaty of Accession. 
 
 
 CAP reform package make significant changes to the acquis on which the accession 
negotiations were based. EU Commission has prepared a legislative proposal for a Council 
Decision adapting the Act of Accession to the Treaties on which the EU is founded, fol-
lowing the reform of the CAP. During the first years after accession all new Member States 
have possibility to choose among following forms of direct payments: 
- payments coupled with production (acreage or headage payments administrated un-
der classic scheme of IACS); 
- single Area Payments (SAP) applied to utilized (kept in a good agricultural condi-
tion) agricultural area; 
- de-coupled farm payments or single payment scheme (SPS), which should be intro-
duced in the period 2005-2009. 
 
 According to official view of Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Latvia the 
direct support to agricultural producers will be administrated in the form of Single Area 
Payments. 
 After Latvia's accession to the EU, the possibility opens to receive less favoured area 
(LFA) payments. According to the draft Rural development plan, areas of four categories 
have been set for Latvia: Category 1 where the support is EUR 50; Category 2 EUR 62; 
Category 3 EUR 71, and areas not falling under LFA status. 
 Farm income has been assessed for years 2006, 2010 and 2013 for EU CAP Agenda 
2000 and CAP Reform scenarios, assuming that farms receive (claim) 100% of the avail-
able support. In Agenda 2000 scenario the support has been calculated including the direct 
payments envisaged by the EU Regulation 2529/2001. In the CAP Reform scenario the 
support is calculated proceeding from the single area payment scheme, where a payment 
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per 1 ha of land maintained in good agricultural condition is calculated by dividing the na-
tional package for Latvia (EU Regulation 1784/2003 and Accession Agreement) with the 
justified area of 1.47 million ha of agricultural land. The calculated 100% SAP rate per 
1 ha of agricultural land is EUR 96.89, including the compensation payments due to reduc-
tion of intervention price for skim milk powder and butter. The direct payment level in 
cases of Agenda 2000 and CAP Reform are provided in table 5.6. 
 
 
Table 5.6 Level of direct payments for Agenda 2000 and CAP reform 
 
 
Payment object Unit Agenda 2000 CAP reform 
   
  2006 2010 
 
 
Field crops: wheat, ray barley, oats, other cereals, rape, flax ton 63 63 
Protein crops ton 72.5 63 
Aid for protein crops ha - 55.57 
Dairy premium ton 11.49 17.24 24.49 
Special beef premium animal 210 210 
Suckler cow premium animal 200 200 
Veal (1-7 month) slaughter premium animal 50 50 
Beef slaughter premium animal 80 80 
Extensification premium animal 100 100 
Sheep and goat premium animal 21 21 
 
 
Source: Council Regulation EC No 1784/2003, Council Regulation EC No 2529/2001. 
 
 
 One of the changes that is the hardest to predict is labour costs, which will definitely 
increase. To avoid this problem, the farm operating results are evaluated according to their 
net value added (NVA) by the farm, which serves as a source for remuneration of the la-
bour input, for of interest and rent payments, and, also the potential profit, which, in its 
turn, is a source for investment and development. In order to evaluate and compare the per-
formance of farms that differ in size, a measurement net value added per annual work unit 
is used (NVA/AWU). 
 
 
5.3 Results obtained 
 
The output value, direct payment and net value added changes have been estimated for the 
Latvian farms with economic size over 1 ESU for following groups: Average farm, Field 
and mixed cropping, Grazing livestock, Pigs and poultry, and Mixed farms. 
 Average farm output value, as a result of the EU common market impact, is expected 
to increase in 2006 by 19% under Agenda 2000 scenario, and by 14% under CAP Reform 
scenario over 2001 level; and in the year to come, in 2010 and 2013, considering the de-
crease of intervention price for milk, a small decrease of value by 2% is expected under 
Agenda 2000 scenario and by 1% under CAP Reform scenario (table 5.7). The forecasted 
input price increase is 11%. 
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Table 5.7 Results for average farm in Agenda 2000 and CAP reform scenario, EURO 
 
 
 2001 Agenda 2000 CAP reform 
    
  2006 2010 2006 2010 
 
 
Output 11,967 14,238 13,990 13,588 13,516 
Inputs 10,617 11,545 
NVA without subsidies 2,108 3,451 3,204 2,801 2,730 
Subsidies (production linked) 574 3,774 4,949 3,774 4,878 
NVA 2,682 7,225 8,153 6,575 7,608 
NVA / AWU 1,407 3,792 4,278 3,451 3,993 
 
 
Source: Author calculations. 
 
 
 An average farm net value added is expected to increase 2.7 times in 2006 and 3 
times starting with 2010 under Agenda 2000 scenario, whereas the increase under CAP Re-
form scenario is slightly below 2.5 times and 2.8 times respectively, because the justified 
areas will be starting with 1 ha of agricultural land, which expands the group eligible to di-
rect payments. 
 A notable increase in support to agriculture is expected after the EU accession: 6.6 
times in 2006 and more than 8 times after catching up with the old member states in 2010. 
For the first time Latvian agriculture producers are eligible to LFA payments, which in 
year 2006 will contribute a half of the support received by an average farm (figure 5.1) or 
even more, because the share to be paid by the Latvian side depends on the budget; during 
the years to come the EU contribution share will increase, thus, the support will on a lesser 
degree depend on the budget and political decisions. 
 As a result of the EU CAP, though, in 2006 Latvian agricultural producers will be 
eligible to maximum 65% of the direct payments available to the old member states, the 
support will increase significantly (6.6 times), and 8.6 times starting with 2010 under 
Agenda 2000 scenario. Under CAP Reform scenario the increase in 2010 is not that big - 
the support calculation base changes with the introduction of area-related payment scheme, 
according to which all national envelope is divided by the area of land maintained in good 
agricultural condition. Consequently, the compensation for the decrease of milk price will 
be allocated not exclusively to milk producers: it will be equally distributed between all 
users of agricultural land irrespective of their specialization. 
 Grazing livestock farms (figure 5.2) and Pig and poultry farms (figure 5.3) will be 
the ones that are affected by the change of the base most of all. 
 The support received by Grazing livestock farms is expected to increase from 4.4 
times to 6.0 times under Agenda 2000 scenario, and from 4.1 times to 5.2 times under the 
Reform scenario. Yet, is should be noted that the said support level will be guaranteed only 
starting with 2013; in the previous years it depends on the budget possibilities and the de-
cisions by the Latvian politicians: in 2006 25% and in 2010 up to 30% of the total direct 
payments. Payments for operating in LFA build a considerable part of the support: in 2006 
they make over 40% for Grazing livestock farms, and in the years to come about one-third 
of total support. 
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Figure 5.1 Support level, sources of financing and NVA per AWU: average farm 2001-2013, euro 
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Figure 5.2 Support level, sources of financing and NVA per AWU: Grazing livestock farms 2001-2013, 
euro 
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 Net value added in Grazing livestock farms drops significantly (by 20%) under the 
Reform scenario, which envisages a steeper decrease of milk prices compared to Agenda 
2000 scenario, and the compensations locked in the total national package do not extend to 
these farms. 
 Pig and poultry farms income (net value added) will significantly reduce a result of 
the EU common market, because the pork and poultry prices might reduce, whereas the in-
put prices might increase: in 2001 this farm group had the highest NVA per labour unit 
EUR 10903, than, as a result of the EU common market impact, under the Agenda 2000 
scenario in year 2006 it will level out with Grazing livestock farms. However, this farm 
group will not have any material NVA/AWU changes in the forecast period, though it is 
the only farm group who will benefit of growth of support size as a result of the reform, 
because Agenda 2000 does not provide for direct payments for Pig and poultry farming, 
whereas in the case of Reform the support is paid per ha of land maintained in good agri-
cultural condition. 
 The NVAV/AWU changes in the farms between the years 2006 and 2010 are de-
scribed in figure 5.4. As a result of joining to the common EU market, the income will 
increase in all farm groups except for Pig and poultry farms. Field and mixed cropping 
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Figure 5.3 Support level, sources of financing and NVA per AWU: Pigs and poultry farms 2001-2013, 
euro 
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farms will experience the most changes, where NVA/AWU will increase from 3.1 to 3.8 
times with practically no differences between the scenarios; yet, this farm group will have 
the lowest NVA/AWU. Mixed farms will demonstrate a slightly higher figure; Grazing 
livestock farms, compared with 2001, will demonstrate a growth by 2.8 to 3.1 times under 
Agenda 2000 scenario and by 2.3 to 2.6 times for the Reform scenario. If under Agenda 
2000 scenario Grazing livestock farms have the highest NVA/AWU, then, under the Re-
form scenario it is Pigs and poultry farm group who demonstrate the highest figure. 
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Figure 5.4 NVA per AWU in Latvian farms in Agenda 2000 and CAP reform scenarios 2001-2013, euro 
 
 
 
Table 5.8 Modulation results 
 
 
Farm types Number of Subject to % Modulation 
 farms modulation  result EURO 
 
 
All farms > 1 ESU 57,388 7,226 13 2,486,138 
including: 
- field, mixed cropping 25,053 3,892 16 1,494,365 
- grazing livestock 1,829 563 31 195,610 
- pigs and poultry 64 14 21 995 
- mixed 30,442 2,754 9 795,168 
 
 
Source: author calculations. 
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 Starting with year 2013 the EU financed support rate is 100%, and modulation ap-
proach is applied to the Latvian farms as well - a support amount over EUR 5000 is 
reduced by 5%, and is channeled to the common fund to be used for the financing of rural 
activities, and the member state may retain up to 80% of these moneys. The modulation re-
sults are presented in table 5.8 out of 57,388 farms with economic size over 1 ESU, 13% 
fall under modulation; the aggregate amount of modulation fund is EUR 2.5 million. 
 Field and mixed cropping farms will be the most generous contributors to the farms - 
EUR 1.5 million, and 16% of farms will be a subject to modulation. Grazing livestock 
farms make the highest share - 31% - of the number of farms undergoing modulation; yet, 
these farms build only 3% of total number of farms. Therefore, the proceeds as a result of 
modulation are mere EUR 200 thousand. 
 Analyzing the impact of CAP Reform on farm groups in the period between 2006 
and 2013, (figure 5.5 in 2006, figure 5.6 in 2010 and figure 5.7 in 2013), one can see that 
the steepest average NVA/AWU fall is in year 2006, EUR 341, while the received support 
amount practically does not change. In 2010 the changes are the least. In 2013, as a result 
of modulation, the support reduces, and, NVA reduces respectively. 
 Yet, the results may vary considerably between farms of different specialization: 
Grazing livestock farms are affected most by CAP Reform: NVA/AWU reduces by EUR 
1300. Though NVA reduces for Field and mixed cropping farms as well, this farm group 
benefits from a small increase of support. Only Pig and poultry farm, under the Reform 
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Figure 5.5 Impact of CAP reform to farms NVA and support level in 2006 per AWU, Euro 
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Figure 5.6 Impact of CAP reform to farms NVA and support level in 2010 per AWU, Euro 
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Figure 5.7 Impact of CAP reform to farms NVA and support level in 2013 per AWU, Euro 
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scenario, have a small increase in support and, starting with 2010, also a positive change in 
NVA. However, it should be taken into consideration that this is exactly the farm group to 
have a notable NVA decrease as an impact of EU common market, and the positive effect 
of the Reform is negligible. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
 
The exchange rate has a material impact on the results: the higher the EUR to LVL ex-
change rate, the more will agricultural producers benefit via direct payments and support 
for operations in LFA. 
 The forecasted income (net value added) increase, as a result of the EU common 
market and support, is expected to be about 3 times in average: 
- 3.1 to 3.8 times in Field and mixed cropping farms; 
- 2.3 to 3.1 times in Grazing livestock farms; 
- a decrease in Pig and poultry farms - by about 61% compared to year 2001 level. 
 
 In 2001 Pig and poultry farms, demonstrated the highest NVA per labour unit 
amounting to EUR 10903, which exceeds that of Grazing livestock farms 4.7 times, while, 
as a result of the EU common market, this figure for both farm groups practically equal-
izes. 
 As a result of CAP Reform, the income is expected to reduce for all farm groups by 
21% in 2006 and by 14% in 2010, except for Pig and poultry farms, and this is the result of 
single acreage payment - the direct payments are no longer related to production, but the 
entire national envelope has been distributed to justified area 1.47 million hectare of agri-
cultural land maintained in good condition. 
 The Reform will have the highest effect on Grazing livestock farms, because it en-
visages a notable cut on dairy intervention price (for butter and skim milk powder), which 
has the largest effect exactly on this farm group: the compensation is locked in the national 
envelope and paid for land maintained in good agricultural condition irrespective of spe-
cialization. 
 Though, for most of farms the income is expected to increase, yet, the farm produc-
tion and cost structure that is in place right now will fail to support a sufficient income 
level for Latvian agricultural producers even after the EU accession. Technical restructur-
ing and increase of efficiency are mandatory prerequisites for assuring the competitiveness 
of Latvian agriculture in common EU market. 
 Decoupling of direct payments from production, and application of single acreage 
payment scheme without any extra payments might serve as motivation for the low effi-
ciency farms to cease production in case the income will be lower than the costs of 
maintaining land in good agricultural condition. 
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6. Use of micro data in policy analysis - the case of the 
 'mid-term review' of CAP 
 
 
Werner Kleinhanß 1 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This paper deals with a rather broad range of aspects: the distribution of farm and off-farm 
income, the share of subsidies on farm income and also its distribution. In the main section, 
impacts of policy decisions are discussed using the mid-term review (MTR) and the na-
tional implementation in Germany as an example. 
 Farm accounting data from the German national network (INLB) as well as from the 
EU (FADN) are used. Statistical methods, simulation approaches as well as mathematical 
(non-linear) programming models are used. 
 
 
6.2 Distribution of income in farm households 
 
Due to the increasing share of part-time farming in Germany, farm income alone is not an 
adequate indicator to describe the income situation. Off-farm income from different 
sources is included in the INLB, but only for single farms. This data is not available for en-
terprises organised as partnerships or legal entities, which are mainly represented in the 
East of Germany. Although data is available, rather intensive plausibility checks are re-
quired before using the data. Another problem is that off-farm income is usually taken 
from tax declarations which necessarily have a time lag. Although we have had access to 
national farm accounting data since 1995/96, we only use data from a constant sample of 
two years (2001/02 and 2002/03) because we have not yet implemented the new aggrega-
tion scheme of EU-FADN for the previous years. The sample of about 5,400 farms is about 
half of the whole network, representing about 130,000 farms (about half of the total of 
farms represented). 
 The distribution of farm and total income is shown by the Lorenz curves (see fig-
ure 6.1). Farm income is largely unequally distributed (2001/2002): 
- about 20% of farms earn about half of the farm's income; 
- for 30% of the farms, negative income is indicated (this share increased in 2002/03). 
 
 Due to off-farm income, the total income is more equally distributed: 
- 40% of the farms earn 20% of total income; 
- another 20% of farms earn 40% of total income; 
- only 5% of farms have rather very low or negative total income. 
                                                 
1 Institute of Farm Economics, Federal Agricultural Research Centre, Braunschweig, Germany. 
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Source: INLB, Sample of 5400 farms, representing 130000 farms.
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of income in farms in Germany - 2001/02 (Lorenz curve) 
 
 
 It is worthwhile to look at the different sources of income by farm size and farming 
type (see figure 6.2). From the total income of the sample, 55% remains from farm income, 
30% is off-farm income and about 15% from social transfers. 
 Compared to the average, income composition is different by farm size and types. 
Three farm groups of up to 100 ESU1 almost have an income level in the average range. 
For the smallest sized farms, (up to 16 ESU), around 10% remains from farm income, 
while three-quarters are off-farm income. In the other group (<40 ESU), 40% remains ei-
ther from farm or off-farm income respectively. In farms with <100 ESU, income 
composition is the reverse of the smallest group. Farms of >100 ESU show higher income 
levels. It must be mentioned that social transfers are almost constant for all farm groups. 
                                                 
1 Economic Size Unit: 1 ESU = 1,200 euro. 
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Figure 6.2 Structure of income by farm type or size 2001/02 
1) 1,200 euro. 
Source: INLB, Sample of 5,400 farms, representing 130,000 farms. 
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Figure 6.3 Income composition by farm type and size 
Source: INLB, Sample of 5,400 farms, representing 130,000 farms. 
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 There are also differences in income composition and total income by farm types 
(figures 6.2 and 6.3). Arable farms, horticultural farms, pig farms and parts of mixed farms 
show an above average income level, while permanent crops, dairy and other cattle farms 
are below the average. The ranking deviates from year to year. Due to price changes, the 
incomes of pig farms decreased in the succeeding year. 
 
 
6.3 Distribution of subsidies respectively direct payments 
 
During the reforms of CAP - reducing price protection and partial compensation with di-
rect payments - direct payments became an important factor for the creation of income. 
The question of de-coupling is also of importance, but will be discussed at the end of this 
paper. 
 Referring to the above-mentioned sample, the level of subsidies is shown in figures 
4.4 and 4.5. On average more than half of farm income remains from subsidies, thereof 
70% from direct payments, 5% from subsidies on inputs and around 25% from other sub-
sidies (including agri-environmental payments, less favoured area allowance and other 
Pillar-II measures). Direct payments are strongly correlated with farm size and differ by 
farm type. 
- as more than 70% of direct payments are for arable crops, they are related to farm 
size; 
- arable farms, other cattle and mixed farms show the highest level of direct payments, 
whilst for horticulture and permanent cropping farms the level is low. 
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Figure 6.4 Subsidies by farm type or size 2001/02 
1) 1,200 euro. 
Source: INLB, Sample of 5,400 farms, representing 130,000 farms. 
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Figure 6.5 Structure of subsidies by farm type and size 
Source: INLB, Sample of 5,400 farms, representing 130,000 farms. 
 
 
 Distribution of direct payments by EU Member States is shown in figure 6.6, based 
on a projection for 2006. Also, the distribution of farms related to the level of directs pay-
ments is shown. In the EU, about half of farms get less than 3,000 euro of direct payments 
due to small farm structure, especially in the South. Only 5% of farms get more than 
50,000 euro. 
 Directs payments are unequally distributed. There is 
- a high share of direct payments in farms getting more than 50,000 euro in Germany, 
the UK and France; 
- a high share of direct payments below the franchise within the modulation scheme 
(5,000 euro) are found in Greece, Portugal, Italy, but also in the Netherlands; this 
share of direct payments will be excluded from modulation. 
 
 Based on these graphs impacts of modulation can be assessed. Modulation is aiming 
at a transmission of parts of direct payments from Pillar-I towards Pillar-II of CAP. Fur-
ther, the payment level per farm will be influenced by a franchise (excluded from 
reductions of premia), capping of premia beyond a ceiling or modifying the premium level 
with regard to labour input, size and income (as in the former French scheme). Referring to 
the proposals of the MTR, reduction of direct payments by modulation is shown in fig-
ure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.6 Distribution of direct payments in EU-15 
Source: Own calculations on base of INLB-EU-GD AGRI/A.3, 1999/2000. 
 
 
 With reference to the position paper of the Commission, it can be mentioned that 
capping leads to strongly differentiated effects between both the farms and the member 
states: 
- in the first year, direct payments would be proportionally reduced by 3%, while the 
premiums above the capping level would be reduced by 100%. On average, premium 
would be reduced by one third in farms affected by capping; 
- since in the European Union about four percent of the farms would be affected, while 
about 45% of the premium volume affected by capping remains in the East of Ger-
many; farms in this region would mainly be affected. 
 
 The option of capping was cancelled in the legislative proposal. The effects of modu-
lation for the East of Germany would therefore be smaller despite the suggested premium 
shortening of up to 19% under conditions of the legislative proposal. The final decision (3-
5% reduction of directs payments beyond the franchise) has no such consequences, and it 
has lower distribution effects by farm types, size and regions. Nevertheless, it is of interest 
of some policy makers to 'modulate' directs payments also with regard to working units, 
etc., and, last but not least, to reduce or to transmit directs payments from Pillar I towards 
Pillar II. 
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Figure 6.7 Impacts of different proposals on modulation of direct payments 
Source: Own calculations on base of INLB_EU_GD AGRI/A 2, Wj 1999/2000. 
 
 
6.4 Policy impacts of MTR and its national implementation on farm income and in-
come distribution 
 
It is always clear that the Luxembourg decisions for price policy measures can be seen in 
the light of a review. Rather far reaching decisions were made with regard to de-coupling, 
and also the obligatory modulation of directs payments. Beside the standard model of de-
coupling, the 'Single Payment scheme' (SP), Member States will have different options of 
national implementation: 
- the regional implementation based on § 58 of the regulation (Rat der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften, 2003), which means that instead of the individual farm premium 
level of a reference period, entitlements can be calculated on the basis of regional 
premia plafonds, which must be related to land, so that unified hectare-based enti-
tlements remain; 
- the partial de-coupling of arable crops and in the livestock sector (besides milk pre-
mium); 
- both systems can be combined. 
 
 The German Federal government and most of the Laender are in favour of a so-
called 'Kombimodel' (BMVEL, 2004). It will be introduced stepwise between 2005 and 
2012, starting with regionally differentiated premia for arable land, grassland (lower level) 
and individual farm premia (based on milk premia, special headage premia, etc.), ending in 
unified entitlements for agricultural land (differentiated by Laender). The Danish scheme is 
comparable with the first step of the German one. 
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 The German system will have large distribution effects by regions, farm types, inten-
sity, etc., especially in its final stage (Kleinhanss, 2003). They can neither be identified at 
the sector level, nor on the basis of the Lorenz curves shown in figure 6.8. The latter indi-
cates a largely unequal distribution of direct payments mainly due to large sized farms in 
the East of Germany. 
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Figure 6.8 Distribution of decoupled payments under MTR in Germany (Lorenz curve) - projections with-
out Modulation 
Source: INLB 1999/2000, 10,800 farms, representing 250,000 farms. 
 
 
 Direct payments at the county level, which are projected on the basis of INLB data, 
are shown in figure 6.9 for both the Single Payment scheme and the Kombimodel. In the 
first case, rather high payment levels can be seen in the northwest and the southeast due to 
a high concentration of bull finishing and milk production. The Kombimodel reduces the 
variances in premium levels between the regions. There are a large number of winners and 
losers even at the regional level. 
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Figure 6.9 Single payment versus Kombimodel 
 
 
 Figure 6.10 shows, that on average, farms with milk production will profit by around 
4% higher premia. Farms with suckler cows will profit in the first period, while they will 
lose in the latter period. Farms with bull finishing will lose about 10% of their premia. On 
the other hand, farms with sugar beets, which where not yet affected by CAP reforms, will 
gain, as long there is no reform of the market regime for sugar. 
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Figure 6.10 Change of direct payments (DP) by the 'Kombimodel' on the average of farms with ... 
Source: FARMIS, own calculation based of BMVEL-INLB. 
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 Changes of direct payments depend largely on the intensity or concentration of pro-
duction. Figure 6.11 shows, that dairy farms with low levels of milk production per hectare 
of grassland will gain, while farms with high milk production per ha will lose up to 20% of 
direct payments in the final stages of the scheme. 
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Figure 6.11 Change of direct payments by the 'Kombimodel' in farms with dairy cows 
Source: Own calculation based of BMVEL-INLB. 
 
 
 MTR impacts on land use, supply, income and income distribution, as well as im-
pacts on rental values for milk quotas and land are assessed for both the single payment 
scheme and the Kombimodel. A non-linear optimisation farm group model, representing 
the German farm sector, is used. 430 rather homogeneous farm groups are built based on 
INLB (Jacobs, 1998; Bertelsmeier, 2004; Kleinhanss et al., 2003). Scenarios are defined 
for 2010, assuming a full implementation of policy measures. A projection of Agenda 2000 
is used as reference. Therefore we do not run the model for the phasing-in period. 
 
Impacts on land use and production 
 
Changes of land use and crop production are affected by the following policy changes: 
- abolition of rye intervention; 
- lower demand for roughage fodder as a result of adjustments in beef production due 
to de-coupling; 
- de-coupling of direct payments. 
 
 Cereal production will be reduced by 8%, mainly resulting from a decrease in rye 
production of more than 20% and a higher set aside in less favoured areas (table 6.1). The 
reduction of food-oilseeds by four percentage points is based on the fact that it loses com-
petitive ability under de-coupling, particularly in low yielding regions. The existing 
premium incentive for silage maize is waived out via de-coupling. It will be partially sub-
stituted for by less intensive field fodder crops. There will be no significant increase of set-
aside, but a greater fallow of arable land. 
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Table 6.1 Impacts of MTR on production and income on the average of farms represented (2010, milk 
price -15% 
 
 
Scenarios Reference Single payment Kombimodel 
 
 
Activities/relative change % 
Cereals ha/% 27 -9.3 -7.5 
Rye ha/% 3 -23.7 -21.8 
Protein crops ha/% 1 -13.5 -11.9 
Oilseeds a) ha/% 5 -0.7 0.3 
Set aside b) ha/% 3 0.2 0.6 
Silage maize ha/% 4 -7.2 -3.5 
Other arable fodder ha/% 3 31.4 29.8 
Sugar beets ha/% 1 3.0 3.4 
Potatoes ha/% 1 2.8 4.4 
Grassland ha/% 15 -0.1 1.3 
UAA ha/% 56 -1.4 0.3 
 
Grassland fallow ha/% 0 -0,2 0.0 
Fallow arable land ha/% 1 152 4 
 
Livestock production/relative change % 
Milk t/% 103 -0.2 0.0 
Beef t/% 4 -13.7 -13.5 
 
Income/relative change % 
Direct payments Tsd. EUR % 16.9 5.5 3.2 
NWSF c) Tsd. EUR % 27.8 1.2 -0.3 
 
 
a) Without non-food rape; b) Including non-food rape; c) Net value of factor costs. 
Source: FARMIS, own calculations based on BMVEL-INLB. 
 
 
 The strongest adjustment reactions can be found in beef production, although no spe-
cific price-policy measures were introduced (see figure 6.13). Bull fattening and suckler 
cow holding, previously favoured by high production-related premiums, will be reduced 
under a de-coupling scheme. Bull fattening will be reduced by 26% on average, whereby 
the adjustments in the north and south will rather be below the average. The number of 
suckler cows will go down by 19%, whereby the adjustments in the north and the centre 
are substantially more pronounced than in the other regions.1 Beef production will be stabi-
lised by the constant supply of cow meat as well as the expansion of heifer fattening, 
which is why the relative change are less pronounced (-14%) than that of bull meat. The 
adjustment reactions occur although a rather favourable development of beef prices is as-
sumed. 
                                                 
1 If agri-environmental measures with a minimum cattle density are applied, suckler cow holding could be 
stabilised (agri-environmental measures are not specified in the model). The compensatory allowance for less 
favoured areas, considered in the model as area premium, has no obvious effect on suckler cow production. 
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 In contrast to beef, milk production will not be reduced despite de-coupling of the 
milk premium under condition of 75% price transmission (Bertelsmeier et al., 2004). The 
main changes in the milk sector are the following (see figure 6.12): 
- increasing quota trade and re-allocation of milk production from small farms towards 
the larger ones; 
- significant decrease of the quota price due to lower milk price and the de-coupling of 
milk premia (which will be shown later). 
 
 A final conclusion is that the scope and allocation of production will be significantly 
influenced by de-coupling as long there is a total de-coupling, but the type of de-coupling, 
either Single Payments or the Kombimodel, will not induce significantly different alloca-
tion effects. 
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Figure 6.12 MTR impacts in farms with dairy cows (milk price -15% including quota trade) 
Source: FARMIS, Kleinhanß/Hüttel FAL-BW. 
 
 
Impacts on income and income distribution 
 
The two schemes will, however, have different impacts on incomes. The net-value added at 
factor costs (NWSF) is used as an income indicator in the following. On average, there will 
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be a small increase of income of 1% under conditions of the Single Payment scheme, while 
for the Kombimodel, income will not change at all.1 
 Impacts on income distribution can only be identified on a rather disaggregated level. 
Figure 6.12 shows income changes in farms with dairy cows, differentiated by the number 
of cows and regions: 
- under the Single Payment scheme, there will be a slightly increase in income in small 
farms (West) mainly due to higher beef prices, and decreasing incomes in the East 
due mainly to modulation; 
- as a result of the Kombimodel, positive income effects can be expected by small 
farms (West) due mainly to higher beef prices, but increasing income losses with in-
creasing farm size (number of cows) and intensity (milk production per hectare of 
roughage area). 
 
 Income effects for farms with beef fattening are shown in figure 6.13. 
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Figure 6.13 MTR impacts in farms with fattening bull (>10 Bulls, milk price -15%) 
Source: FARMIS, own calculations on base of INLB. 
                                                 
1 The slightly lower income level is mainly influenced by the fact that entitlements for the Kombi-model are 
derived from statistical data base, while INLB date are not at all consistent to them. 
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- Under the Single Payment scheme income increases with livestock density mainly 
due to increasing beef prices, but also due to farm adaptations. Even if the number of 
beef cattle is reduced, the latter does not affect the premium level. 
- Under the Kombimodel, premium reductions are so high, that the above-mentioned 
income effects are not only neutralised, they are even higher, meaning negative in-
come effects remain in farms with a high density of beef production. 
 
Impacts on rental values for milk quota and land 
 
Price policy measures and de-coupling will also affect values of land and quota. Referring 
to this question, the farm group model has been extended to deal with quota trade and rent-
ing-in/out of land with/without transmission of entitlements (Bertelsmeier, 2004). 
 Figure 6.14 shows that rental values for milk quotas will decrease more than half due 
to the reform. Changes of quota prices are mainly influenced by the level of lowered milk 
prices under conditions of de-coupled payments (which do not influence producer incen-
tive prices). They are not influenced much by the type of de-coupling. 
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Figure 6.14 Equilibrium prices of milk quota in German trade regions 
Source: FARMIS, Kleinhanß/Hüttel FAL-BW. 
 
 
 Rental values for land will be influenced as follows (figure 6.15): 
- under the Single Payment scheme, rental prices will go down for arable land and 
grassland, but much less for the latter ones; 
- under the Kombimodel, rental prices for arable land will reach the rather high level 
of the reference or even increase. For grassland, rental values will increase drasti-
cally. The main reasons are that there is almost no land free of entitlements, and the 
premium level, especially for grassland, is much higher than present rental prices. 
 
 Finally it can be concluded, that beef and dairy farms with above average level of in-
tensity will be affected most. Income losses are so high, that investments and farm 
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developments might be negatively affected. This could be avoided by a scheme like the 
Danish one, which is comparable to the first step of the German Kombimodel. 
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Figure 6.15 Impacts of decoupling on rental value of land at regional level 
Source: FARMIS, Kleinhanß/Hüttel FAL-BW. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
Conclusions to the subject under consideration are: 
- individual farm (accounting) data is required for the analysis of farm income and dis-
tribution effects of policy reforms. Data is not at all valid for other income sources 
(off-farm income, social transfers), which became more important due to structural 
changes and economic development; 
- different methods are required to deal with these questions. Disaggregated farm 
models, embedded in a network of micro and macro models, are needed to assess 
impacts of drastic policy changes such as total de-coupling or the distribution effects 
of policy intervention like capping premia within modulation or the implementation 
of de-coupled payments as in Germany; 
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- another experience gained is that policy measures are tailored in such a way that 
rather moderate income effects at sector level remains; otherwise it would be politi-
cally difficult to obtain majorities at the EU level. Nevertheless, distribution effects 
should not be forgotten; 
- farmers are able to adapt farm organisation with respect to changing economic condi-
tions. But there are restrictions in farm adaptation, so that negative economic effects 
could remain. This will especially true for rather radical policy changes in the short 
term. 
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7. Farmers income distribution and subsidies: Product 
 discrimination in direct payment policies for continental 
 and mediterranean agriculture 
 
Ricardo Mora and Carlos San Juan 1 2 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we propose an index to evaluate how egalitarian the direct payment policy in 
the European Common Agricultural policy is. Our index can be suitably defined to incor-
porate flexible definitions of egalitarian income support objectives. In the empirical 
illustration, we present strong evidence of discrimination against Mediterranean versus 
Continental farming for sensible definitions of equality in the ex-post distribution of per 
capita income, a result in line with the existing literature. in addition, we also show that, 
within these two types of farms, smaller and more labor intensive farms are discriminated. 
If land value is introduced in the objective function of the policy maker, then no discrimi-
nation against Mediterranean farming can be observed. However, the result on the 
discrimination for smaller farms (both in terms of their land value and in terms of their 
economic size) and for labor intensive farms (both in terms of working hours and units of 
labor) still holds. 
Key Words: Direct payments, Income distribution, CAP reform, favoritism. 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This paper's main motivation is the measurement of the unequal distribution between farm-
ers of direct payments which arises because of the European Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). The CAP's recent reform proposals imply a sharp increase in the role of direct 
payments as a tool to support farm income without disturbing international markets. From 
1990 until 2001, direct income payments in the European Union jumped from 6.4 per cent 
to 19.9 per cent of total Gross Value Added at basic current prices, an astonishing 311.4 
per cent increase. In the new CAP, the vast majority of subsidies will be paid independ-
ently from the volume of production. In 2001, direct income programs entailed 19.9 per 
cent and 20.0 per cent of total Gross Value Added at basic current prices in the European 
Union and Spain respectively and the figure is expected to increase. 
 In this paper we propose a very simple approach to measure the unequal distribution 
between farmers of direct payments based on the empirical literature on wage discrimina-
tion. From the onset of the CAP, a minimum income for the farmers was a target of the 
                                                 
1 Address for correspondence: Dpto. Economía. C/Madrid, 126 28903 Getafe. Madrid. Spain. 
e-mail: csj@eco.uc3m.es, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
2 We acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture and Ricardo Mora 
acknowledges financial support from the Spanish DGI, Grant BEC2003-03943. We also wish to thank Jose 
Eusebio de la Torre for his invaluable assistance in the process of table editing. 
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policy. In fact, one of the main explicit objectives of the CAP as defined in the Treaty of 
the European Economic Community, Article 33, was 'to ensure a standard of living for ag-
ricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture'. Currently, 'Eradication of poverty' is also one of the Union's objec-
tive in the 'Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe' (Art. 3 point 4). The 
importance of the minimum income objectives is also prevalent in the aims of the reform 
proposals. In a recent explanation of these proposals, Commissioner Fischler pointed out 
that ' A key principle of the new CAP is decoupling, which spells more market orientation, 
less trade distorting support, and places the focus on quality rather than quantity. It means 
that from 2005 onwards, the majority of subsidies will come in the form of a single farm 
payment, will be independent of production, and instead tied to farmers' meeting manda-
tory food quality, safety, environmental, and animal welfare standards under the principle 
of cross-compliance'.1 
 Given the strategic role that direct payments are going to play in the future distribu-
tion of resources among the farmers of the European Union, it is of great interest to 
provide a quantitative approach to measure the degree by which these programs are biased 
against or in favor of certain products. The allocation of direct aid spending among farmers 
is very unequal in two ways. First, the bulk of direct income support is concentrated in few 
beneficiaries. For example, in its MEMO/02/198 the Commission acknowledges that in the 
2000 financial year, 5.39 per cent of beneficiaries received 50.22 per cent of all payments 
for the 15 EU countries except Greece (for which no published data is available). In the 
case of Spain, 3.34 per cent of beneficiaries received 38.20 per cent of all payments. Sec-
ond, and probably related to the first issue of inequality, the distribution of direct aid 
payments among crops is very asymmetrical. The most important action under which 
farmers receive income is the set-aside program and animal premiums. As a result, the per-
centage of payments which was directed towards arable crops and livestock in the year 
2000 amounted to 92.71 and 79.78 per cent of all payments in the EU and Spain respec-
tively. Although not data is available for the distribution of direct income payments by 
crops, it is still possible and illustrative to look at the CAP budget distribution by crops as 
direct income programs are an important share of this total. In this respect, in 1999, 45.65 
per cent of total CAP expenditure was allocated to arable crops, 11.71 per cent to beef and 
veal, 6.41 per cent to dairy products and 5.41 per cent to sugar. Overall, Continental prod-
ucts neared 70 per cent of all payments. In contrast, Mediterranean products received less 
than 12 per cent. The most important actions for Mediterranean products are aids for fruit 
transformation and market withdrawals. As a result, fruits and vegetables obtained 3.70 per 
cent of overall expenditure, olive oil earned 5.31 per cent and wine received 2.10 per cent. 
                                                 
1 Fischler, in the speech 04/177 which took place on the 14th of May, 2004. See EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION. As confirmation of the re-enforcement of the role of direct payments in the future 
Commission's proposal to Reform the Meditarranean products, the Commissioner says: 'Within the 
framework of a given budget, these answers can be summarized as follows: the best way to support producers 
is to directly support their income'. Videoconference with Greek journalists in Brussels on the 15th of April, 
2004. 
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 As for Spain, a country with a larger share of Mediterranean agriculture, the unbal-
anced distribution of CAP expenditure still favoured Continental products and is broadly 
similar to the EU as a whole. In 2000, arable crops reached 37.8 per cent, the figure being 
26.7 per cent for cereals. On the other hand, fruit and vegetables only accounted for 8.6 per 
cent of total expenditure. The main difference with respect to the EU distribution of aid 
rests on the importance of olive oil and wine in Spanish agriculture. As a result of this, aid 
to olive oil and wine amounted to 15.8 per cent 4.1 per cent respectively in 2000. In order 
to evaluate the distributional impact on the proposed single payment by farm, it is neces-
sary to assess the current system's asymmetry and test if the status quo could be maintained 
through the new scheme. 
 The literature about direct payments and the CAP reforms focuses on the relation be-
tween direct payments and their international aggregate income effects both to Member 
States and third countries rather than the relation between direct payments and the redis-
tributing effects between farmers' incomes. Josling (2003) is concerned that changes in 
domestic policy to shift from price support to direct payments may have unexpected distri-
butional effects as direct payments may become themselves entitlements unrelated with the 
original justification. There are also some fears about the distributional effects of free trade 
negotiations as in Boussard et al. (2004) and Timmer (2000). The European Commission 
has provided evaluations on the aggregate effects on cohesion stemming from the CAP, as 
in Commission (2004). 
 Surprisingly, to our knowledge, there is an absence of studies on the distributional 
impact of the direct aid programs. In this paper we aim to do this by proposing a very sim-
ple empirical approach which draws heavily on the literature on wage discrimination as in 
Oaxaca (1973). In these studies, differences in average wages between groups are the re-
sult of several factors. First, average differences in human capital lead to expected average 
productivity differentials, and these result in differences in average wages between any two 
groups of workers. Workers suffer from discrimination if they cannot obtain the wages that 
their productive activity would normally command. Previous models on labor market dis-
crimination, as in Thurow (1969), Bergmann (1971), and Madden (1975), suggest that this 
effect should be decomposed into two components, the cost imposed to those discrimi-
nated, and the benefit obtained by those favoured. We apply the basic tools of this 
literature to study which major crops are favoured or discriminated by the direct income 
support system in the CAP. We focus our empirical illustration to Spain's most representa-
tive farm types of Continental versus Mediterranean agriculture: cereals versus fruits and 
vegetables. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definition of 
egalitarian direct payments policies. Section 3 is devoted to the measure of direct payment 
policy bias. Section 4 describes the data and presents main results. The paper ends with a 
summary of the findings, and briefly discusses their implications for efforts to reform the 
CAP. 
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7.2 Egalitarian direct payments policies 
 
The observed income of the farm, Y results from the sum of direct payments, D, plus all 
other incomes, R, (such as agricultural income and rural tourism or other non-agricultural 
earnings), 
Y = D+R. 
 
 The second term, R, implicitly includes the effect of price support policies under 
CAP programs (guarantee price, tariffs, quotas, calendars of import, etc.) on top of the 
other farm earnings. For any given farm with vector of characteristics X Є Rn, an ex-post 
egalitarian direct payment policy which guarantees a minimum income C per worker can 
be defined as a real function D(X) : Rn → R such that 
 
D(X)+R =C*L 
 
where L is the number of workers in the farm. If we normalize this condition by dividing 
by R and take logarithms we get: 
 
log(D(X)/R+1) = log(C)+log(L)-log(R) 
 
 Taking into account that log (D(X)/R+1) ≈ D(X)/R ≡ d(X), we have: 
 
    d(X) = c+l-r+ε (1) 
 
where lowercase represents the logarithm of the variable and e is an error term. Equation 
[1] simply states that farm direct payments as a fraction of all other incomes should ap-
proximately be a linear function of the logarithm of the number of workers minus the 
logarithm of non-direct-payments for each farm. 
 Let us now assume that X represents the farm's specialization in a product (i.e. the 
farm type), X = k, k = 1, ...,K. A between-types egalitarian policy satisfies: 
 
 dk = c + l - r + ε,        k = 1, ...,K. (2) 
 
A policy is said to be non-egalitarian within farm type k if 
 
 dk = b0k + β1k * l + β2k * r+ ε (3) 
 
and (β0k, β1k, β2k)′ ≠ (c,1,-1)′. Note that a policy is non-egalitarian between different farm 
types if there are at least two types of farms, k′ and k′′, such that (β0k′, β1k′, β2k′)′ ≠ (β0k′′, β1k′′, 
β2k′′)′. If a policy is non-egalitarian among farm types, then it is non-egalitarian. Whenever 
a policy is non egalitarian among farm types, at least one farm type will suffer discrimina-
tion, that is, farms of that type will receive less than what they would receive if they were 
of any other type. Similarly, at least one farm type will enjoy favoritism, i.e., farms of that 
type will have preferential treatment. In this situation, we can state that the policy has bias 
in favor of some types and against some others. Since this is a measurement problem, we 
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need an statistical strategy to determine the bias in direct payment policies. In the next sec-
tion, we use decomposition techniques from the wage discrimination literature to present a 
framework to do so when K = 2. 
 It is possible in this framework to propose more flexible definitions of egalitarian 
policies. For example, it may be argued that minimum income objectives for farmer or ag-
ricultural worker should be corrected for differencials in costs of living across regions. 
Assume that there are J regions in the country. A simple way to account for persistent dif-
ferences in these costs is by allowing for different minimum income objectives by region. 
Then, an egalitarian policy now takes the form: 
 
    djk = cj + l - r + ε,            j = 1, ...,J; k = 1, ...,K. (4) 
 
where cj is the target level for region j. More generally, it can be argued that income poli-
cies should also reflect other objectives enshrined in the design of agricultural policy. For 
example, it could be the case that the policymaker wants to give more income per worker 
to those farms where land is more extensive, irrespective of output levels. One rationale for 
this could be that environmental care of large extensive farms require more maintenance 
costs. Then, an egalitarian policy where the farm's exogenous characteristics, z, like loca-
tion or size, are given premium vector γ would be: 
 
    dk(z) = γ z + l - r + ε,              k = 1, ...,K. (5) 
 
 Here we do not intend to study the appropriateness of the policy premia g, but simply 
to assess whether they differ by crop type (between farm-type discrimination), and also 
whether the policy is egalitarian within each type of holding. 
 
 
7.3 Measuring direct payment policy bias 
 
In this section, we outline a methodology to measure policy bias between any two types of 
farms. Without loss of generality, assume the egalitarian policy guarantees a minimum 
equal to all farms and consider farm types k = 1 and k = 2. Assume that we have a sample 
of N1 type 1 farms and N2 type 2 farms. In vector notation, the policy equation for type 1 
farms takes the form: 
 
    y1 = X1b1 + e1 (6) 
 
where y1 = (d11,d12, ...,d1N1)′, X1 = (1N1 , lN1, rN1)′, so that matrix X1 is composed of column 
vector of ones and the N1-dimension column vectors representening the logarithm of farm 
labor, lN1 = (l1, l2, ..., lN1)′, and the logarithm of other incomes, rN1 = (r1, r2, ..., rN1)′. The 
column vector b1 = (β01, β11, β21)′ includes the policy parameters for type 1 farms. Finally 
e1 = (ε1, ε2, ..., εN1)′ is the vector of error terms. Similarly, the policy equation for type 2 
farms takes the form: 
 
    y2 = X2b2+e2 (7) 
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 We can write average policy equations within each group as: 
 
    y1 = X1b1+ ē1 
    y2 = X2b2+ ē2, (8) 
 
where the bar superscript stands for the average operator. Let b be the policy structure that 
would exist if farmers from groups 1 and 2 were treated equally by the direct income pol-
icy. It is straightforward to decompose the average policy structure for each farmer type in 
three components. For example, take farmer type 1's average subsidy per nonsubsidy in-
come: 
 
    y1 = X1b + X1 (b1 - b) + ē1 (9) 
 
 The first term on the right-hand side of the equation, X1b, amounts to the average ra-
tio if the policy was egalitarian.The second term, X1 (b1 - b), accounts for the actual policy 
divergence from the egalitarian benchmark. Following Oaxaca (1973), if this term is posi-
tive, it is natural to call it 'favoritism' as it reflects the fact that farms of this type are getting 
more subsidies than the egalitarian allocation among farm types. Likewise, if the term is 
negative, then it can be called discrimination against type 1's farming. The last term, ē1, 
measures average errors and should typically be close to zero. 
 Finally, we can account for the differences between the two types of farming by sub-
tracting the average of the second type from the average of the first type, so that we have: 
 
   y1 - y2 = X1 (b1 - b) + X2 (b - b2) + (X1 - X2) b + ( ē1 - ē2) (10) 
 
 The first two components in the right hand-side of the equation measure the impor-
tance of different premia for the two groups. If the first term is positive, this indicates that 
group 1 benefits from favoritism while a positive sign in the second coefficient would indi-
cate that group 2 is the victim of discrimination. The third component measures the effect 
of different average labor units and non-subsidy income by farming type on the policy gap. 
Finally, the last component reflects the importance of average error terms and it is assumed 
to be close to zero. 
 The decomposition in Equation (10) cannot be computed because b, b1, and b2 are 
unknown vector parameters. Assuming that the process of receiving subsidies is exogenous 
to the farmer, estimation by OLS of policy Equations (6) and (7) only provide consistent 
estimates for b1 and b2, leaving b, the egalitarian policy structure, partly unidentified. 
 Under the egalitarian policy structure, (β0k′, β1k′, β2k′)′ ≠ (c,1,-1)′. In the context of 
wage discrimination in the labor market, Neumark (1988) has given some clues on the na-
ture of non-discriminatory wage structures by using an extension of the employer 
discrimination model of Arrow (1972) and Becker (1957). In our context, Newmark's ap-
proach implies that if policy makers only care about the proportion of each type of farmer 
receiving support within each type of support program, then the egalitarian policy c is: 
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   c1N1+c2N2 
   c = (11) 
    N1+N2 
 
 Equation (11) shows that the egalitarian policy constant term, c, is a weighted aver-
age of each group's term, ck, k = 1, 2. Thus, following Neumark (1988)'s suggestion, we 
can estimate the egalitarian constant term by pool OLS regression of each farm's d -l +r 
over a constant in the entire sample. Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) showed that Neumark's 
pooled decomposition is a generalization of previous proposals by Oaxaca (1973), Reimers 
(1973), and Cotton (1988). 
 The econometric strategy when the egalitarian policy is evaluated within regions, 
thus allowing differing minimum objectives across them, is a simple generalization of this 
approach. In particular, the coefficients cj, j = 1, ...,J can be estimated by pool OLS regres-
sions of d - l + r over regional dummy variables using the entire sample. 
 Finally, the econometric strategy when the egalitarian policy is evaluated within re-
gions and taking into account other objectives in the policy is again simple to compute. In 
particular, the coefficients γ can be estimated by pool OLS regressions of d - l + r over re-
gional dummy variables and the other relevant characteristics (from the point of view of 
the policymaker) using the entire sample. 
 In the next section, we apply this decomposition to study the income between Medi-
terranean and Continental farmers in 16 Spanish regions. 
 
 
7.4 Presentation of Data and Results 
 
7.4.1 Data set and variables 
 
We use data from the 2001 Red Contable Agraria Nacional (RECAN), an annual national 
survey prepared by the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture. This survey is part of the Euro-
pean Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN). The questionnaire is filled in by county 
accountancy agencies that collect information directly from the commercial farms. It has 
information on direct payments and other incomes of around 7000 farms and 70 crops. We 
focus our study on the two most important major farm types for the Spanish Continental 
and Mediterranean agriculture: Cereals versus Fruit and Vegetables oriented farms. Fi-
nally, the survey also provides information on the number of people employed and 
working in the farm, and land area. 
 In Spain, Continental-type farms are geographically concentrated in the center of the 
country while the Mediterranean coastal regions produce mainly Fruit and Vegetables. Al-
though our illustration does not include olive oil or wine, two important Mediterranean 
products, we do not intend to imply that they are not interesting from the point of view of 
the distributional effects of direct payments policies. On the contrary, given that the former 
has enjoyed until 2004 significant direct subsidies while the latter has not, it would be very 
interesting to understand the implication soften this differentiated treatment under our 
framework. We leave this issue for future research. 
 In the analysis, we look at the continental farm type vis-a-vis the Mediterranean ori-
ented holdings. So, the sample is divided into two sub-samples. The Cereal farming sample 
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consist of 1,267 while the Horticulture sample is 74. The variable specification includes 
the logarithm of number of hours worked, the AWU per farm, the direct payments linked 
both to the products and inputs as for any other concepts (set a side, early retirement, 
mountain areas, etc.) the farm agricultural income and other rents (non agricultural earn-
ings), land area and value. In both types of agriculture, farmers' unions and regional 
authorities provide both information and advise on how to apply for direct subsidies. Most 
of these subsidies are automatic in the sense that within a farm type, all farmers qualify. 
Specialization in Spanish agriculture by regions is driven by fundamentals and market ac-
cess - and is not policy driven - (see, for example, Mora and San Juan, 2004). Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that, in spite of the admittedly small sample for fruits and vegetables, 
there is not a sample selection problem on the direct payments program neither for cereals 
nor fruits and vegetables. For simplicity, we will refer the latter as 'horticulture' in the fol-
lowing. 
 
7.4.2 Results 
 
Before presenting the regression results, we provide a summary of descriptive statistics re-
lated to the average level of subsidies per farm in tables 7.1 to 7.4. Table 7.1 shows the 
distribution of average payments per farm by economic size class. Controlling for size, 
Continental farms always receive more direct payments than horticulture type farms. Over-
all, the latter receive around 10 per cent of the average payment assigned to the former. 
 
 
Table 7.1 Direct payments per farm 
 
 
Economic size class (ESC) Average payments (euros) 
  
 cereals horticulture total 
 
 
Less than 2 ESU 4,472.13 . 4,472.13 
From 2 to less than 4 ESU 2,721.64 403.68 2,224.94 
From 4 to less than 6 ESU 3,495.34 . 3,495.34 
From 6 to less than 8 ESU 5,156.36 . 5,156.36 
From 8 to less than 12 ESU 6,651.98 522.05 6,389.27 
From 12 to less than 16 ESU 9,519.75 619.68 9,138.31 
From 16 to less than 40 ESU 17,040.81 1,795.55 16,045.97 
From 40 to less than 100 ESU 34,716.76 3,484.20 32,677.52 
From 100 to less than 250 ESU 84,785.41 6,657.90 79,690.13 
Equal or greater than 250 ESU 247,654.30 . 247,654.30 
    
Total 21,467.60 2,171.22 20,340.58 
 
 
 
 
 In table 7.2, we present direct payments per annual working units (AWU) by eco-
nomic size and region for cereals. Overall, in each of the regions, the larger the size of the 
farm, the larger the average value of the subsidy. Average payments per worker tend to be 
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Table 7.3 Direct payments per Annual Working Units. Horticulture 
 
 
Region Economic size class (ESC) 
  
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X total 
 
 
Galicia . . . . . . . . . . . 
Asturias . . . . . . . . . . . 
Cantabria . . . . . . . . . . . 
País Vasco . . . . . . . . . . . 
Navarra . 403.68 . . . . . . . . 403.68 
La Rioja . . . . . . 737.23 322.91 . . 457.65 
Aragón . . . . . . . . . . . 
Cataluňa . . . . 248.41 . . . . . 248.41 
Baleares . . . . . . . . . . . 
Castilla y León . . . . 583.36 543.19 1,082.90 . . . 940.86 
Madrid . . . . . 341.56 782.51 1,751.37 1,448.37 . 1,226.76 
Castilla La Mancha . . . . . 661.28 1,906.67 1,525.76 . . 1,638.28 
Valencia . . . . 367.35 . . 70.66 . . 233.52 
Murcia . . . . . . 1,862.33 . . . 1,862.33 
Extremadura . . . . . . 965.34 2,145.66 7,136.06 . 2,358.96 
Andalucía . . . . . . 406.33 . . . 406.33 
Canarias . . . . . . . . . . . 
  
Total . 403.68 . . 347.52 531.53 1,229.44 1,375.09 2,874.85 . 1,253.91 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.4 Direct payments per Gross Added Value 
 
 
Region Working hours per Gross Added Value classes 
  
 cereals horticulture total 
   
 I II III IV total I II III IV total 
 
 
Galicia . . . 0.546 0.546 . . . . . 0.546 
Asturias . . . . . . . . . . . 
Cantabria . . . . . . . . . . . 
País Vasco 0.470 0.525 0.702 0.654 0.488 . . . . . 0.488 
Navarra 0.508 0.506 0.687 0.670 0.512 . . 0.029 0.019 0.026 0.504 
La Rioja . 0.391 . . 0.391 . . 0.032 0.048 0.041 0.070 
Aragón 0.504 0.607 0.602 0.668 0.544 . . . . . 0.544 
Cataluňa 0.378 0.477 0.433 0.704 0.425 . . . 0.055 0.055 0.421 
Baleares . . . . . . . . . . . 
Castilla y León 0.566 0.716 0.642 0.638 0.628 . 0.036 0.066 . 0.040 0.613 
Madrid 0.356 0.415 0.476 0.470 0.401 0.040 0.041 0.122 0.097 0.081 0.344 
Castilla La Mancha 0.479 0.547 0.470 0.544 0.495 0.082 0.159 0.085 0.106 0.118 0.457 
Valencia . . 0.563 0.696 0.639 . 0.025 0.004 0.024 0.015 0.215 
Murcia 0.498 . 0.413 0.773 0.492 0.011 0.125 . . 0.056 0.340 
Extremadura 0.339 0.500 0.602 0.731 0.546 0.152 0.081 0.027 . 0.089 0.512 
Andalucía 0.536 0.583 0.587 0.676 0.544 . . 0.031 0.037 0.033 0.542 
Canarias . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Total 0.510 0.620 0.589 0.643 0.552 0.089 0.073 0.062 0.084 0.075 0.532 
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higher in the Continental regions. In table 7.3, we present similar information for Horticul-
ture. For the country as a whole we again observe that size is related to average payments. 
However, the distribution of direct subsidies between regions is more volatile and much 
less connected to production. For example, Valencia, a main producer for citrics presents a 
very low average precisely because citrics receive very little support from the CAP in the 
form of direct payments. 
 Average subsidy payments by region and labor intensity are presented in table 7.4. 
Four classes of labor intensity, ranging from the less intensive (I) to the more labor inten-
sive types of farms (IV) are considered. Average payments seem to be uncorrelated to the 
intensity of labor in the production process at national and regional levels both for Cereals 
and Horticulture. A similar result is obtained if, instead of using working hours, we use 
number of workers. 
 Thus, to sum up, subsidies are larger for cereals and for larger farms. Their associa-
tion with the number of working units (or the number of workers) is not direct. There are 
also important variations by regions. Simple direct descriptive statistics from the RECAN 
data set therefore replicate well-known results already pointed out even by the European 
Commission. Direct payments programm seem to lead ex-post to a very unequal distribu-
tion of resources per working unit. In the following, we asses to what extent this basic 
finding is replicated in our methodological framework. To do so, we are going to consider 
four alternative definitions of an 'egalitarian' policy. 
 We refer to 'Egalitarian 1' as a policy of direct payments which would guarantee the 
same level of income per working hour in any region regardless of the type of farming. We 
define 'Egalitarian 2' as the policy under which all farmers within the same region would 
be guaranteed the same amount of income irrespective of the type of farming. 'Egalitarian 
3' would be the policy under which all farmers within the same region and the same land 
area would obtain the same income regardless of the type of farming. Finally, 'Egalitarian 
4' would be the policy under which all farmers within the same region and the same land 
value would attain the same income regardless of the type of farming. 
 To what extent the ex-post distribution of direct income payments between farms re-
flects an 'Egalitarian 1' or 'Egalitarian 2' policy within types of farming can be assessed by 
inspection of the regression results at table 7.5. The first three columns refer to 'Egalitarian 
1'. The first four columns are the regressions carried out within types of farming. Thus, the 
first two column results are obtained from the sample of Cereal-type farms, while the re-
sults in column 3 (coefficients) and 4 (t-values) refer to the sample of Horticulture-type 
farms. The third column estimates are obtained from the pool sample. Note that the coeffi-
cients for l and r in this column are restricted to 1 and -1 respectively, so that the values in 
this column reflect the egalitarian policy ´a la Neuman. The same structure is replicated in 
columns 7 to 8, but in relation to 'Egalitarian 2'. 
 We can conclude that neither for Cereals nor for Horticulture the policies are Egali-
tarian 1 or 2 since the parameter estimates for l and r are significantly different from 1 and 
-1 respectively. For Cereals the ex-post distribution of subsidies seems to replicate a policy 
which gives a premium to farms with a large economic size (the parameter for r is close to 
-0.5) and a penalty for labor intensive farms (as the parameter for l is lies below 0.5). For 
example, looking at the results from the 'Egalitarian 1' regressions, we can conclude that if 
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Table 7.5 Policy regressions. OLS estimates 
 
 
 Equal income Equal income within regions 
   
 cereals horticulture egalitarian 1 cereals horticulture egalitarian 2 
 
 
Constant 3.39 (16.64) 0.60 (2.45) 2.47 (117.60) 
Galicia       2.10 (7.85)   0.71 (2.96) 
País Vasco       3.18 (14.10)   2.83 (22.53) 
Navarra       3.21 (14.92) 1.15 (4.50) 2.89 (32.63) 
La Rioja       2.66 (5.36) 1.27 (4.55) 1.81 (5.98) 
Aragón       3.06 (14.98)   2.50 (48.42) 
Cataluňa       2.85 (13.13) 1.28 (4.26) 2.35 (23.64) 
Castilla y León       3.14 (15.21) 1.18 (4.69) 2.47 (72.83) 
Madrid       2.62 (11.73) 1.28 (4.82) 1.97 (22.77) 
Castilla La Mancha       3.03 (15.32) 1.36 (5.03) 2.66 (51.04) 
Valencia       2.72 (8.84) 1.19 (4.50) 1.79 (7.50) 
Murcia       2.86 (9.45) 1.26 (4.73) 2.59 (9.40) 
Extremadura       2.82 (13.14) 1.31 (4.87) 2.01 (39.15) 
Andalucía       3.24 (15.71) 1.20 (4.47) 2.97 (51.82) 
l 0.35 (12.69) 0.03 (1.08) 1.00  0.42 (14.80) -0.05 (-1.59) 1.00 
r -0.54 (-45.80) -0.07 (-3.08) -1.00  -0.57 (-47.72) -0.07 (-3.12) -1.00 
 
R2 (adjusted) 0.6378  0.0928  0.0000 0.8860  0.6030  0.9317 
 
 
Note: Egalitarian 1: Minimum income; Egalitarian 2: Minimum income within regions. 
 
 
Table 7.6 Policy regressions. OLS estimates. Controlling for land area/land value 
 
 
 Equal income within regions and land area Equal income within regions and land value 
   
 cereals horticulture egalitarian 3 cereals horticulture egalitarian 4 
 
 
Galicia 3.52 (20.55)   -0.41 (-1.97) 2.69 (15.98)   -1.24 (-5.77) 
País Vasco 4.15 (28.92)   1.22 (9.67) 3.32 (23.45)   0.34 (2.32) 
Navarra 3.97 (29.17) 1.79 (7.81) 1.26 (12.29) 3.14 (23.30) 1.48 (7.04) 0.36 (2.74) 
La Rioja 3.82 (12.22) 1.54 (6.77) 0.70 (2.73) 2.99 (9.61) 1.23 (5.51) -0.53 (-1.97) 
Aragón 3.81 (29.47)   0.84 (10.03) 2.99 (23.30)   -0.04 (-0.34) 
Cataluňa 3.99 (28.78) 1.67 (6.76) 0.96 (9.29) 3.17 (23.23) 1.36 (5.70) 0.09 (0.71) 
Castilla y León 3.92 (29.97) 1.45 (7.07) 0.85 (11.12) 3.10 (23.89) 1.14 (5.69) -0.06 (-0.51) 
Madrid 3.73 (26.15) 1.50 (6.99) 0.55 (5.76) 2.90 (20.67) 1.19 (5.62) -0.43 (-3.45) 
Castilla La Mancha 3.83 (30.49) 1.53 (7.08) 1.10 (13.62) 3.00 (24.18) 1.22 (5.67) 0.17 (1.54) 
Valencia 3.46 (17.84) 1.52 (6.98) 0.62 (2.99) 2.63 (13.63) 1.21 (5.74) -0.47 (-2.14) 
Murcia 3.43 (18.00) 1.58 (7.23) 1.17 (4.87) 2.60 (13.69) 1.27 (5.99) 0.14 (0.55) 
Extremadura 3.68 (27.06) 1.53 (7.07) 0.39 (4.70) 2.86 (21.22) 1.22 (5.72) -0.51 (-4.48) 
Andalucía 4.17 (31.76) 1.53 (6.94) 1.40 (16.85) 3.34 (25.82) 1.22 (5.71) 0.52 (4.60) 
a 0.48 (42.61) 0.11 (6.07) 0.38 (22.97) 0.48 (42.61) 0.11 (6.07) 0.42 (23.68) 
l 0.17 (9.06) -0.10 (-3.58) 1.00  0.17 (9.06) -0.10 (-3.58) 1.00 
r -0.67 (-85.34) -0.09 (-4.71) -1.00  -0.67 (-85.34) -0.09 (-4.71) -1.00 
R2 (adjusted) 0.9551  0.7483  0.9519  0.9551  0.7483  0.9528 
 
 
Note: Egalitarian 3: Minimum income per worker within regions and land area; Egalitarian 4: Minimum income per 
worker within regions and land value. 
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Table 7.7 Decomposition of average direct payments shares 
 
 
 y Egalitarian 1 Egalitarian 2 Egalitarian 3 Egalitarian 4 
      
  x ·b favoritism x ·b favoritism x ·b favoritism x ·b favoritism 
 
 
Cereals 1.097 1.073 0.023 1.082 0.014 1.114 -0.017 1.091 0.006 
t-ratio  43.52 5.105 44.08 3.14 45.07 3.79 44.06 1.18 
Horticulture 0.087 0.461 -0.375 0.317 -0.230 -0.194 0.281 0.180 -0.093 
t-ratio  7.19 6.01 4.33 3.23 2.56 3.91 2.13 1.17 
 
 
Note: t-ratios obtained from 1,000-replication bootstrap. 
 
 
the ex-post distribution reflects the authorities objectives, then rather than aiming towards 
a minimum income C such that d =     the direct payments policies is closer to the function 
d =        as far as Cereals are concerned. 
 For Horticulture, the conclusions are slightly different, as the parameter for l is not 
significant neither for 'Egalitarian 1' nor for 'Egalitarian 2'. The number of working hours 
(or indeed the number of workers, which is not shown for brevity) is not influencing the 
amount of direct payments received by farms. Thus, there seems to be no connection to 
any objective of income support by worker or working hours for Horticulture. Of course, 
this absence of link implies a penalty per worker or per working hour in the policy. With 
respect to economic size, we find evidence supporting the claim that the larger the farm, 
the larger is the ex-post support, as the parameter is negative and smaller than 1. 
 In table 7.6, we present the regression results concerning 'Egalitarian 3' and 'Egalitar-
ian 4' policies. These definitions of policies are more flexible definitions of equity as they 
allowed for income to differ between farmers along with the amount of land. The differ-
ence between 'Egalitarian 3' and 'Egalitarian 4' lies in the fact that the quality of land varies 
significantly across types of faring. In particular, land values are much higher in Horticul-
ture than in Cereals, where pecuniary returns per square hectare are much lower. 
 As in the previous two policies, we reject for both types of farming that the CAP im-
plies an ex-post distribution of payments which are egalitarian within types of farming. As 
in Table 4, we can also conclude that labor intensive farms are heavily discriminated, but 
in this case the result also applies to Horticulture farming. As in 'Egalitarian 1' and 'Egali-
tarian 2', we also observe that smaller farms in term of overall income are penalized in both 
types of farming. We also find that land areas and values are significant factors to explain 
variation of support between farms. Larger farms in terms of their land receive more direct 
support. 
 Until now, we have been able to conclude that the CAP does not result in an ex-post 
equal distribution of income amongst farmers within type of farming. However we have 
still not addressed the issue of discrimination and favoritism between types of farming. We 
do this in table 7.7. We present a decomposition of average direct payment shares by type 
of farming into the components set up in Equation [9] using the estimates from Tables 5 
and 6. Note that as we carry out OLS estimations with constants, error terms sum up to 
zero by construction and the third term in the decomposition therefore disappears. 
 Negative values under the heading 'Favoritism' imply of course 'Discrimination'. For 
cereals, the shares under the different policy objective ranges from 1.073 ('Egalitarian 1') to 
R
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R
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1.114 ('Egalitarian 3'). Given that the actual average share is 1.097 we find favoritism in all 
definitions except 'Egalitarian 3' which place great importance in giving a premia to land 
area. Of course, the results are symmetric for Horticulture. Note that there is 'Favoritism' 
only under 'Egalitarian 3'. Sample size for each type of crop will of course determine how 
far is the policy within each type of crop from the 'Egalitarian' policy `a la Neumann. 
Therefore the effect of discrimination for Horticulture on the average share is always larger 
than the effect of favoritism for Cereal. 
 It should however be stressed that all estimates are significant, except for 'Egalitarian 
4'. Using the 'Egalitarian 4' variable specification, we find that the CAP direct payments 
policy renders an ex-post distribution of income which does not amount to neither dis-
crimination nor favoritism for any type of crop. Given the fact that 'Egalitarian 4' implies a 
payments scheme which controls for land values -and therefore, monetary crop returnsthis 
finding suggests that the policy is driven to compensate land capitalized values. 
 
 
7.5 Some thoughts as concluding remarks 
 
A main contribution of the paper is to propose a measure to evaluate how egalitarian the 
direct payment policy in the CAP is. We propose definitions of favoritism and discrimina-
tion among different farm types and within farm types. Our indexes can be suitably defined 
to incorporate flexible definitions of egalitarian income support objectives. 
 We present strong evidence of discrimination against Mediterranean versus Conti-
nental farming for sensible definitions of equality in the ex-post distribution of per capita 
income, a result in line with the existing literature. In addition, we also show that, within 
these two types of farms, smaller and more labor intensive farms are discriminated. 
 Finally, we find that if land value is introduced in the objective function of the policy 
maker, then no discrimination against Mediterranean farming can be observed. However, 
the result on the discrimination for smaller farms (both in terms of their land value and in 
terms of their economic size) and for labor intensive farms (both in terms of working hours 
and units of labor) still holds. 
 We started this research motivated by the reform proposals for the CAP. In the words 
of the EU Commissioner, agricultural support in the EU is 'now no longer coupled with 
output volumes but largely paid out as direct support to farmers' incomes'. (Fischler, 16 
March 2004 Bulgaria and the EU National and International Economic University. Sofia). 
Why do we still find biases in 2001? The problem seems to be that applying the direct 
payment on historical basis and allowing the creation of a new kind of 'property rights' 
(payments property) on the past level of protection the direct payment effectively links 
support to the size of the farm. There are important political restrictions to the effective re-
form of the CAP towards a more equal and fair policy. Commissioner Fischler tried to 
introduce dynamic modulation on the 2003 CAP reform. But the biggest setback for Fis-
chler's reform in 2003 proposals came as some countries blocked a plan to cut the prices at 
which the EU guarantees to buy cereals. Mr Fischler had hoped to bring EU prices closer 
into line with those on the world market. The Commission has also difficulties in the appli-
cation of a planed reduction of direct payments for bigger farms from 2007 onwards. To 
the credit of the EU authorities, their plans aim to correct the current imbalance that 80 per 
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cent of CAP currently goes to only 20 per cent of the farms. The proposed system intro-
duces the principle of progressive contributions according to the overall amount of direct 
payments received in order to ensure that reductions in direct payments are balanced and 
simple to apply. Regardless of whether the proposals are effective and reach a successful 
outcome, it seems undisputable that the re-distributional effects of the new support system 
is a key question for farmers' income in the future and should have a significant differenti-
ated impact by region. 
 
References 
 
Arrow, K., 'Some Mathematical Models of Race Discrimination in the Labor Market'. In: 
Racial Discrimination in Economic Life, ed Anthony Pascal, 187-203. Lexington: D.C. 
Heath, 1972. 
 
Becker, G.S., The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press., 
1957. 
 
Boussard, J.M., F. Gérard, M.G. Piketty, A.K Christensen and T. Voituriez, May the pro-
poor impacts of trade liberalization vanish because of imperfect information? Contributed 
paper selected for presentation at the 25 th IAAE Conference, Durban, South Africa, Au-
gust 16-23, 2004. 
 
Commission, Common Policies and Cohesion, Brussels, 2004. 
 
Cotton, J., 'On the decomposition of wage differentials'. Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 70, 236-243, 1988. 
 
Cotton, J., 'Color or Culture?: Wage Differences among Non-Hispanic Black Males. His-
panic Black Males and Hispanic White Males'. Review of Black Political Economy 21(4), 
53-67, 1993. 
 
Heckman, J.J., 'Sample selection bias as a specification error'. Econometrica 47, 153-162. 
University Press, NY, 1979. 
 
Josling, 'Key ussues in the World Trade Organization Negotiations on Agriculture', Ameri-
can Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(3):663-667, 2003. 
 
Mora, R. and C. San Juan, 'Geographical Specialization in Spanish Agriculture Before and 
After Integration in the European Union Regional Science and Urban Economics Vol 
34(3): 309-320, 2004. 
 
Neumark, D., 'Employers' Discriminatory Behavior and the Estimation of Wage Discrimi-
nation'. Journal of Human Resources 23, 279-295, 1988. 
 89
Oaxaca, R., 'Male-female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets'. International Eco-
nomic Review 9, 693-709, 1973. 
 
Reimers, C., 'Labor Market Discrimination Against Hispanic and Black Men'. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 65, 570-579, 1983. 
 
Timmer, P., 'The macro dimensions of food security: economic growth, equitable distribu-
tion, and food price stability', Food Policy 25, 283-295, 2000. 
 
Thurow, L.C., Poverty and Discrimination. Brookings Institution,Washington, DC, 1969. 
 90
8. A short history of the FADN and other activities than 
 agriculture 
 
 
Keijo Hyvönen 1 
 
In Council Regulation 79/65 the field of survey of the FADN was defined so that is should 
cover those agricultural holdings, which: 
- are run as market-oriented holdings, and 
- provide the main occupation of the operator 
 
 During the first three years data was taken only from agricultural holdings having an 
area exceeding five hectares, with the exception of holdings producing wine, fruit, vegeta-
bles and olives. 
 In 1972 the definition was amended. In addition to being market-oriented, the hold-
ings in the field of survey should: 
- provide the main occupation of the operator; 
- ensure the employment, per year, of at least one worker (1 work unit). This threshold 
could, however, be reduced to 0.75 work units. 
 
 European size units were introduced in 1981. After this amendment, the field of sur-
vey of the data network should comprise all the agricultural holdings having an economic 
size equal to or greater than a threshold expressed in European size units (ESU), irrespec-
tive of any outside work the operator may engage in. In spite of the change, also after 1981 
0.75 AWU seems to have been in many Member States a pre-condition for a holding to be 
included in the sample. 
 Although other activities than agriculture, pursued by the farmer or the farming fam-
ily, should not prevent a holding to be included in the sample, the contents of the European 
farm return still consists mainly of agriculture. 
 According to Commission Regulation 2237/77, data in the farm return concern ex-
clusively the agricultural holding. These data refer to activities of the holding itself and, if 
appropriate, to both forestry and tourism connected with the farm. Nothing connected with 
any non-farming activities of the holder or of his family, or with any pension, inheritance, 
private bank accounts, property external to the agricultural holding, personal taxation, pri-
vate insurance, etc., is to be taken into account in preparing the farm returns. In practice, 
data on contract work, forestry and tourism are registered in the farm return. 
 In the beginning of 90's, a study concerning pluriactivity and non-farm incomes of 
agricultural households was conducted, with a detailed proposal how these items should be 
recorded. However, doubts were cast whether the Council Regulation made possible to col-
lect such a data. The proposal did not lead to any changes in the Farm Return. 
                                                 
1 Head of unit AGRI.G.3, European Commission. 
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European Commission - Directorate General for Agriculture Hyyvönen/AGRI-G.3
FADN field of survey
? 1965: agricultural holdings, which:
- are run as market-oriented holdings, and 
- provide the main occupation of the operator
?1972: agricultural holdings, which:
-provide the main occupation of the operator
-ensure the employment, per year, of at least 
one worker (1 work unit); this threshold could, 
however, be reduced to 0.75 work units
 
 
European Commission - Directorate General for Agriculture Hyyvönen/AGRI-G.3
FADN field of survey
?1981: agricultural holdings:
-having an economic size equal to or greater 
than a threshold expressed in European size 
units (ESU
-irrespective of any outside work the operator 
may engage in
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European Commission - Directorate General for Agriculture Hyyvönen/AGRI-G.3
Contents of the farm return
? data in the farm return concern exclusively the 
agricultural holding
? data refer to activities of the holding itself and, if 
appropriate, to both forestry and tourism connected with 
the farm
? nothing connected with any non-farming activities of the 
holder or of his family, or with any pension, inheritance, 
private bank accounts, property external to the 
agricultural holding, personal taxation, private insurance, 
etc., is to be taken into account in preparing the farm 
returns.
 
 
European Commission - Directorate General for Agriculture Hyyvönen/AGRI-G.3
Other activities on the holding
? Contract work; 12% of holdings
? Forestry; 5% of holdings (not FIN, SWE)
? Tourism; 1% of holdings
? Processing of milk; 3% of holdings
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European Commission - Directorate General for Agriculture Hyyvönen/AGRI-G.3
Other gainful activity of the sole holder (Census 2000)
0 %
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100 %
No
Subsidiary
Major
No 82 59 54 75 68 75 56 74 83 79 63 70 57 37 64 70
Subsidiary 4 % 7 % 6 % 2 % 4 % 6 % 14 1 % 5 % 8 % 13 2 % 17 20 12 4 %
Major 14 34 39 22 28 19 30 25 12 13 24 28 26 43 24 26
BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK EU-15
 
 
European Commission - Directorate General for Agriculture Hyyvönen/AGRI-G.3
Organisational form in 2002 (Source:FADN)
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Other
Partnership
Family farm
Other 1% 5% 3% 0% 16% 0% 0% 1% 1%
Partnership 6% 1% 0% 2% 47% 0% 1% 6% 9%
Family farm 93% 94% 96% 98% 38% 100% 99% 93% 90%
DEU ESP ITA LUX NED OST SUO SVE UKI
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European Commission - Directorate General for Agriculture Hyyvönen/AGRI-G.3
Organisational form 2002, the Netherlands
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
(1)Family farms (2) Partnerships (3) Other
(3) Other 13% 39% 24% 7% 4% 19% 15% 16%
(2) Partnerships 43% 26% 37% 55% 47% 55% 54% 47%
(1)Family farms 44% 35% 39% 38% 49% 26% 31% 38%
(A) 
Fieldcrop
(B) 
Horticultu
(D) Other 
perm.
(E) Milk (F) 
Livestock
(G) 
Granivor
(H) Mixed All
 
 95
Workgroupssession Typology 
 
 
A workgroup session has been organised on typology. Several reasons underpin this 
choice. The change in the CAP (single historic farm payment) severly effects the surrent 
EU Typology. Multifunctionality and non-farm income is the other reason for discussing 
this topic. Results are given below. 
 
Group 1 
 
Do we need a classification and why? 
What are the classification factors? 
What are the available data? 
 
We want a stable system 
We need a basic structure 
 
  Origins of the actual system 
   
 is from market approach 
 
- changing functions countryside 
- income regions 
- social economic structure farm size 
- environmental issues farm type 
- animal welfare 
 
 Looking for revision ... 
 with regard to - policy 
  - research 
 or - ... 
 
There arises a need for new data on: 
(Family) Business or Household 
 
Group 2 
 
- which users? 
 
  household typology 
- which typology? 
  business typology 
 
- which types? 
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4 Dublin 
Ireland 
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Doria, Paola 
INEA 
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Italy 
paola.doria@inea.it 
 
Hansen, Øyvind 
NILF 
Mørkvedbukta 
8020 Bodø 
Norway 
oyvind.hansen@nilf-nn.no 
 
Haukas, Torbjørn 
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P.O. Box 
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